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ABSTRACT

Ever since SOEs were reformed and restructured in 1978, corporate governance has
been a major topic in China. As the two main aspects of corporate governance,
managerial compensation and CEO turnover have been used as CEO incentives to
monitor and align their interests with the shareholders. Their relationship with firm
performance has also been studied extensively. In addition, the political and regulatory
environment plays an important role in the Chinese market because it is underdeveloped
and many of China’s listed firms are state owned and politically connected. Therefore,
the main concern of this research is the effectiveness of corporate governance in China.
This thesis first examines the association between political connection and CEO
turnover and the CEO turnover performance relationship to provide evidence on the
effectiveness of corporate governance. This thesis further identifies the implicit
incentives for CEOs, namely the political promotion generated from their concerns
about a political career, and investigated the interaction with explicit monetary incentive.
Finally, this thesis examines the compensation incentive for CEOs and the effect that
ownership structure has on the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance.
With regard to monitoring CEOs, this thesis investigates the relationship between
political connection and CEO turnover and its relationship with firm performance. This
research found that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance, a pattern
that is more significant in privately controlled firms. This thesis also provided evidence
iv

that politically connected CEOs are less likely to be dismissed and political connections
can weaken the CEO turnover-performance relationship. Moreover, the turnoverperformance relationship within politically connected firms is weaker with managerial
ownership. This thesis also documents an improvement in firm performance following
turnover. The evidence suggests a substitute effect of political connection for
disciplinary mechanisms, and political connections influence the turnover-performance
relationship through managerial ownership when firms confront an underdeveloped
market environment.
In addition, this thesis identifies an important incentive system in SOEs; CEO
political promotion. Many CEOs are politically appointed by the government and as
such, are more concerned about being assessed by government officials. As a unique
incentive mechanism exercised in China’s SOEs this thesis finds that the probability of
CEO political promotion is positively related to firm performance. Interestingly, this
thesis also finds that the incentive effect of CEO political promotion is a substitute for
CEO compensation-based incentive. This thesis also points out that the incentive of
CEO political promotion helps mitigate weak explicit incentives in China’s SOEs.
These results are robust corrected for endogeneity between CEO political promotion
and firm performance, including a new definition of political promotion.
Finally, this thesis examines the relationship between managerial compensation and
firm performance using data from China’s listed firms. The results show that the payperformance relationship is positive and significant in China’s listed firms. As the
largest shareholder is always acting as the controlling shareholder who exercises
v

effective monitoring, this thesis further divides the total sample into three groups based
on their actual owners: SOEs affiliated to State Asset Management Bureaus (SAMBs),
SOEs affiliated to the central and local Government (SOEs), and privately controlled
firms. This thesis found that the positive pay-performance relationship in SOEs and
privately controlled firms remains, however, CEO pay is positively related to firm
accounting performance in SOEs, while market performance is positively related in
privately controlled firms. This thesis also examines the effects of ownership structure
on the pay-performance relationship by measuring the ownership structure by two
variables: cash flow rights and excess control rights (the divergence between the control
rights and cash flow rights of the largest shareholder). Previous studies suggested a
positive incentive effect of cash flow rights and a negative entrenchment effect of
excess control rights (Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003). Consistent with
the evidence from previous studies, the estimation results show that cash flow rights
have a positive effect on accounting performance based pay schemes in SOEs and
market performance based pay schemes in privately controlled firms. This thesis also
provides evidence that excess control rights have a negative effect on different CEO pay
schemes in either SOEs or privately controlled firms. This thesis also distinguishes
firms with and without foreign investors, and finds evidence that firms with foreign
investors compensate their CEOs more highly than those without.
Overall, this thesis examines the main aspect of corporate governance, CEO payperformance relationship and the CEO turnover-performance relationship, and provides
evidence that political connections and ownership structure exercise significant effects
vi

on corporate governance. Specifically, political connections can entrench poorly
performing CEOs and weaken the turnover performance relationship. After being
identified, political promotion shows a positive effect on motivating CEOs and
substitutes for a monetary incentive, which suggests that facing the environment with an
underdeveloped legal system and weak corporate governance, political connections are
not always inconsistent with the aim of maximizing firm value. Furthermore, the
ownership structure of the controlling shareholder can affect the application of
performance based pay schemes across listed firms, among which cash flow rights have
positive effects while excess control rights have negative effects on monetary incentives.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction
Executive compensation is at the core of a firm’s corporate governance and is an
important component of their incentive structure. Because ownership and control were
separated, managers were granted more power in decision making and began to accept
primary responsibility for maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, the issue of how
to effectively monitor and compensate top executives and give them incentives is a
serious concern because it helps to evaluate the quality of the corporate governance
system (Kato and Long, 2005). Moreover, Faccio (2006) pointed out that political
connection was a common phenomenon around the world, especially in countries where
the legal and institutional system was underdeveloped, and he argued that in these
countries firms had incentives to become politically connected to take advantage of any
preferential treatment by government. Meanwhile, politically connected firms tended to
maintain concentrated ownership and which forced controlling shareholders to adopt
managerial pay schemes according to their own objectives (Firth et al., 2006a; Chen et
al., 2011). However, the effect of political connection and ownership structure on
internal monitoring and incentives has not yet been answered, thus this thesis seeks to
fill this void by examining the relationship between political connection and CEO
turnover-performance and pay-performance sensitivity using China’s listed firms as an
example.
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Chinese firms were used in this thesis for two reasons. First, China is the largest
transitional economy and one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Allen et al.,
2005). Second, its unique institutional settings provide a unique laboratory in which to
examine the effect of political connection and ownership structure on CEO incentive
and monitoring mechanisms. Since 1978, China has adopted state owned enterprises
(SOEs) reform where the central theme is corporatization and privatization. In the early
1990s when two stock exchanges were established in Shanghai and Shenzhen, many
SOEs were privatized by issuing shares to the public and listing them on these stock
exchanges. The aim of corporatization and privatization is to establish a modern
enterprise system and separate ownership from control and in addition, due to a lack of
investor protection and a low level of law enforcement, China has a poor corporate
governance system, so shareholders may believe that internal monitoring is more
reliable than external monitoring mechanisms. It is therefore essential that a
management incentive and monitoring system aligns the interests of managers and
shareholders.
This thesis aims to investigate the effects of political connection on CEO incentives
and monitoring mechanisms. In this thesis, political connection is defined as CEOs who
are current or former officials of either the central government, local government, the
military, or members of government related entities, including the National People’s
Congress (NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and
the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC). Political connections can
provide firms with access to credit, regulatory protection, and financial assistance from
2

government. This characteristic motivates companies to establish these in order to
influence the political process and seek government protection. Moreover, these
connections can entrench CEOs because firms are unlikely to surrender these
preferential resources (Fan et al., 2007; Faccio, 2010; Faccio et al., 2010). This thesis
therefore addresses the following question: does political connection affect CEO
monitoring mechanisms through the turnover-performance relationship.
In addition, this thesis provides a more comprehensive look at political connections
and investigates the incentive that political promotion has on the CEO pay-performance
relationship. China’s managerial labour market includes a unique political component
where government has the authority to select and appoint CEOs to SOEs. This
component provides political promotion incentives for CEOs where they are more
concerned about their political careers and have less working opportunities outside this
political labour market (Bo, 2009). This thesis defines political promotion as CEOs who
left their managerial positions for higher or more prestigious posts which were
politically connected. This incentive for political promotion is implicit and
unobservable, so empirically this study first used a regression to estimate the probability
of political promotion and then examined the effect of political promotion on CEO payperformance relationship with the value of predicted probability of political promotion.
This thesis also examines the effect of ownership structure on the CEO incentive
mechanism. One important feature of China’s listed firms is the concentrated ownership
structure by way of political connection and pyramid structure (La Porta et al., 1999;
Chen et al., 2011). As a result, controlling shareholders have substantial control rights
3

but relatively small cash flow rights by which they could expropriate from minority
shareholders, so the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of
controlling shareholders may affect the application of performance based pay incentives.
In this sense China is an excellent environment in which to conduct this research
because alongside its economic development has unique characteristics such as political
connection, ownership structure, and employee wage structure, which are different from
other transitional economies and developed countries. Therefore, to better understand
the substantial effects generated from China’s unique environment, this thesis will
review its institutional background as described in the following section.
1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Political connection in China’s listed firms
Political connection exists in both SOEs and privately controlled firms. After the
SOEs began restructuring in 1978, the state relinquished some authority because the
government wanted to adopt a market-oriented economy, but it still maintained absolute
control over many large and strategic SOEs in sensitive industries. More importantly,
the state kept control over the personnel system, maintaining the right to appoint, select,
and dismiss many top executives in these SOEs, an action which naturally resulted in
corporate political connections. In addition, since the separation in the early 1980’s of
government functions from enterprise management, many government officials revealed
their political connections by taking up managerial positions in SOEs.
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Meanwhile, private investors also have incentives to build political connections in
order to seek rents from the government because of underdeveloped legal and
institutional system in China and lack of protection for outside investors. There were
two waves of political connections established in privately controlled firms. Early the
1990s after Deng Xiaoping’s inspection of South China, many government officials
were encouraged to become self employed and establish their own businesses. The
second wave refers to the fact that during the early 2000s, some government officials
gave up their original positions for posts in privately controlled firms. Furthermore,
privately controlled firms would also like to appoint politically connected CEOs,
especially when they encounter financial distress (Li et al., 2006). Political connection
in privately controlled firms is treated as a resource and protection from the government
which can improve firm performance and overcome state or market failure (Li et al.,
2008).
1.2.2 SOEs reform and ownership structure
In 1978 China started its economic reforms and introduced a market oriented
economy that has grown enormously. The main part of these reforms is reform of the
SOEs with the aim of transforming traditional SOEs into profitable, modern firms, and
also modernise the enterprise system 1 . Before economic reforms commenced, every
enterprise was controlled by the central government, but since the SOE reformation
began, the state tried to relinquish their shareholdings and de-centralise. Before the
1
It usually refers to corporatization and privatization. Corporatization is referred to the process of transformation
from former SOEs into modern firms. Privatization is referred to the fact that SOEs issued shares to the public and
listed on the stock exchanges.
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State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(SASAC) was established in 2003, SOE reform took place in three stages.
Stage one was from 1978 to 1984 where the aim was to give the SOEs enough
autonomy and incentives and set up internal profit retention and sharing systems. Stage
two was from 1985 to 1992 where, according to the modern enterprise theory proposed
by Coase (1932), the aim was to emphasise the separation between management and
ownership. This eventually converted into a contract responsibility system between
managers and shareholders, and decision making rights being shifted from state level to
management level. Stage three was from 1993 to 2002 where modern enterprise systems
were established in SOEs. In the Third Plenary session of the Fourteenth Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Congress held in 1993, a modern enterprise system was called
for the first time in order to further improve firm performance and operational
efficiency. In the Tenth session of the National People’s Congress in 2003, the SASAC
has been established by merging some functions of three ministries, including the
Central Work Committee for SOEs, the National Economic and Trade Commission, and
the Ministry of Finance. The aim of SASAC was to completely take over the SOEs,
including regulating state owned assets management, and restructuring and evaluating
them, and so on. SASAC represents the central government and is responsible for
improving the profitability of SOEs and enhancing the management of state-owned
assets invested in them. The establishment of SASAC can be regarded as the beginning
of the fourth reform stage.

6

Since the reform of SOEs began in 1978, the state was giving enough autonomy to
enterprises and trying to relinquish its shareholdings, but it was unwilling to give up its
controlling position. Since the early 1990s when two important stock exchanges were
established in China, most SOEs were partially privatised and listed on the stock
exchanges, and issued shares to the public. However, agents of the central government,
such as legal entities, still retained enough shares to control the voting, so the dilemma
of giving enough autonomy to SOEs while still controlling the vote, distinguishes China
from other transitional economies and provides an excellent environment to study
managerial compensation.
According to the Corporate Law of China and the Chinese Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) regulation, listed firms generally issue three types of shares, state
shares, legal person shares, and common A shares. Of these, the central government and
its agents such as government bureaucratic agencies, SOEs, and other legal entities own
the state shares, and they are non-tradable 2 . Common A shares are widely held by
individuals and private organizations, and they are freely traded on the stock exchanges,
and every share issued by listed firms are entitled to the same voting and cash flow
rights. One distinct characteristic of China’s listed firms is the continued existence of
one dominant shareholder whose ownership is higher than the second largest
shareholder, and this dominant shareholder is always the central government and its
agents. This indicates that in most instances, governments at various levels still have
substantial control over these partially privatized SOEs.
2

Under the special situations, these state shares and legal person shares can be traded under the authority of CSRC.
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1.2.3 Wage reform and managerial compensation in China’s listed firms
Alongside economic reform in SOEs went wage reforms designed to offer better
incentives and improve firm performance (Estrin, 2002). There were three waves of
wage reforms in 1950, 1956 and 1984, respectively. In 1950 just after the People’s
Republic of China was established, the first wave of reform aimed at reconciling
different wage systems into one wage system where wages were distributed according
to his or her work. During this stage however, different areas and industries had
different wage structures so in 1956, the aim was to unify the wage system at state level.
The consequences of this second reform were that employees began to receive cash
salaries and compensation, while managers were compensated on the basis of their
corporate hierarchy and civil service pay scale, which had no relationship to either firm
performance or individual contribution. And therefore, any variation in wages only
reflected differences across regions, industries, and the regional consumer price index.
The third stage consisted of two sets of reforms promulgated in 1984 and 1992. In
1984 the Ministry of Labour (MOL) announced that wage budgets should be linked to
the economic performance of an enterprise, measured by firm profitability or a
combined indicator of economic returns (Yueh, 2004). The goal was to provide profit
centred incentives. In 1992 the SOEs were allowed to set their own internal wage
structure within the overall budget established by the central government. Although
autonomy was awarded, the wage budget still had to be approved by the Ministry of
Labour.
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Since 1995, every listed company was permitted to set their own wages relative to
firm performance (Yueh, 2004). In 2003, SASAC was established and extended the
implementation of a ‘yearly salary system’ for top executives. It issued regulations
requiring that CEO compensation must consist of salary and bonus, and relate to a
firm’s economic performance. Thereafter, the relationship between CEO pay and firm
performance has been further strengthened in SOEs and this change in the payperformance relationship will be discussed in more detail in following chapters.
However, long term incentives such as stock options and restricted stocks, which were
prevalent in developed countries, were not granted to top executives in China’s listed
firms until 2006 because of the lack of incentives and high rate of turnover (Firth et al.,
2006b). Even after 2006 the number of firms who granted stock options and restricted
stocks to top executives was less than 5% of the total number of listed firms. For
example, at the end of 2010 there were only 47 firms granting stock options and
restricted stocks, while there were more than 1800 firms listed on two stock exchanges.
In addition, according to the Labour Law, privately controlled firms are free to set
their own wage structure and corporate hierarchy. Any agency problems that exist in
privately controlled firms are between managers and public investors. In order to
achieve better firm performance and provide enough incentive for managers, privately
controlled firms tend to set a comparatively higher remuneration to keep top executives
and widen the pay gap within the top management team. This gives more power to
managers who can then make all the major decisions.

9

1.3 Motivation and contributions
Corporate governance is an important aspect in the success of China’s economic
reforms and it has received extensive attention from academics. Their studies mainly
focused on the incentive (CEO compensation) and disciplinary (CEO turnover)
mechanisms aimed at improving corporate governance.
However, no one has considered the effect that political connection and ownership
structure has on CEO incentives and disciplinary mechanisms. The unique market
environment in China provides an opportunity to further study these corporate
governance issues. This thesis will fill this gap and shed light on these issues by
examining China’s listed firms.
This thesis makes several major contributions to the extant literature on corporate
governance. Firstly, it adds to the extant literature by examining the effect of political
connection on CEO turnover and the CEO turnover-performance relationship. It
provides further evidence on whether political connections affect CEO turnover and
whether it substitutes internal governance by lowering turnover-performance sensitivity.
Political connections provide an effective method for CEOs to entrench themselves.
Secondly, this thesis identifies CEO political promotion, the implicit incentive for
CEOs in SOEs, which is unique under China’s politically controlled personnel system.
It provides evidence that political promotion is positively associated with firm
performance and the incentive of political promotion substitutes for the incentive of
compensation, which is quite low and insufficient in China. This alternative incentive is
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helpful to understand the weak link between managerial compensation and firm
performance observed by previous studies (Firth et al., 2006; Kato and Long, 2006).
Thirdly, this thesis shows how the cash flow rights and excess control rights of the
largest shareholders affect the CEO pay-performance relationship. This study argues
that in China the largest shareholders exercise substantial control where ownership is
concentrated. It is suggested that cash flow rights have a positive effect and excess
control rights have a negative effect on accounting performance based pay scheme in
SOEs affiliated to central and local governments, and on market performance based pay
scheme in privately controlled firms.
Finally, this thesis helps understand corporate governance and CEO incentive and
monitoring mechanisms in the context of China.
1.4 Structure of this study
Chapter 2 examines political connection and its association with CEO monitoring
mechanism, namely CEO turnover. Political connection is a common phenomenon in
SOEs and privately controlled firms, although with different incentives and motivations.
Based on previous studies in other countries as well as China, political connection can
benefit firms by providing financial assistance, convenient access to bank loans, relaxed
tax regulations, and preferential corporate bailout. However, politically connected firms
also need to devote substantial resources to their rent seeking activities, which may well
eliminate any advantage from political connections (Faccio, 2010). Therefore, exactly
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what benefits political connection has on corporate governance, i.e. CEO turnover and
turnover-performance relationship is still a question to be answered.
Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of compensation-based incentive and political
promotion-based incentive for CEOs in China’s listed SOEs. Apart from the external
managerial labour market there is also an internal political labour market which
provides political incentives for managers to improve firm performance. This incentive
depends largely on China’s unique personnel control system and characteristics of listed
SOEs. Moreover, as two incentive mechanisms have been exercised in China, are they a
substitute or do they complement each other?
The largest shareholder is the dominant shareholder, so any scheme for setting
managerial compensation depends on who is the largest shareholder. Because the
objectives and motivations of the largest shareholders vary considerably, this thesis
conjectures that CEO pay scheme and pay-performance relationship may be different
across firms with different types of large shareholders. To test this primary hypothesis,
this thesis examined the effect of different types of largest shareholder on CEO
performance-based pay schemes. Besides a multivariate analysis of the total sample,
this thesis further divides firms into groups based on the ultimate type of shareholders,
and predicted that firms with different types of largest shareholders may have different
performance based pay schemes. The theoretical background is that under the efficiency
incentive mechanisms, CEO pay should be a function of firm performance (Murphy,
1999). More importantly, this thesis examined the effects of ownership structure, i.e. the
cash flow rights and control rights of the largest shareholder, and how it affected the
12

pay-performance relationship. This is the main subject of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is the
concluding chapter.
Furthermore, before the empirical analysis in each Chapter, the assumptions of both
two-sample t-test and multivariate analysis are investigated to draw the conclusions.
Specifically, for the two-sample t-test, both paired Student’s t-test and Wilcoxon
signed-rank test are adopted. If the assumptions are met, the Student’s t-test results are
trustworthy, and if the assumptions are not met, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is the
alternative which is not constrained by the assumptions. For comparison, I report both
Student’s t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test results. For the multivariate analysis, the
assumptions are also checked. In particular, several assumptions are fulfilled in the
proper design of the regression which is discussed in detail in each Chapter. Another
assumption is that the variables are consistent with the normal distribution. If this
assumption is not met, the log specification is used to satisfy this assumption. I have
also tried to remove the outliers to improve the variable normality.
Since 1998, listed firms in China are required to disclose managerial compensation
and turnover in their annual reports. In 2001, China gained access to the WTO and since
then a new code of corporate governance and new accounting and auditing practices
have been applied. This thesis collected this data to examine CEO incentive and
monitoring in China’s listed firms.
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Chapter 2: Political connection and managerial entrenchment: evidence from
CEO turnover in China
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of political connection on CEO turnover and the
turnover-performance relationship. A substantial amount of literature analyzing this
topic has emerged in recent years (Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008;
Claessens et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Faccio, 2010; Faccio et al., 2010), much of it
focusing on the sources of value such as preferential access to credit, regulatory
protection, and financial assistance from government. While these benefits can enhance
firm value there is an acknowledged downside associated with political connection
deriving from the substantial resources dedicated to rent seeking activities (Faccio,
2010). Fan et al. (2007) provided evidence from China that supports the negative effect
that political connection has on firm performance in SOEs, although several papers
document a positive effect in privately controlled firms (Li et al., 2006; Li et al., 2008).
CEO turnover is an important disciplinary mechanism for managerial incentive as a
credible threat to replace under-performing CEOs. CEO turnover and its relationship
with firm performance has been studied extensively (Denis et al., 1997; Volpin, 2002;
Huson et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2008; Conyon and He, 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009).
These studies treat CEO turnover as an internal monitoring mechanism. They document
a negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance and also found an
improvement in firm performance after a CEO had been replaced. However, there is no
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existing research that analyses the implications of political connections on the CEO
turnover-performance relationship. This thesis attempts to fill this gap.
Political connections in China are a common phenomenon. With the corporatization
and privatization of SOEs in China since 1978, state shareholders have decentralized
authorities to some extent, but still hold control rights on personnel decisions. Central
and local governments still have authority over the selection, appointment, and
dismissal of top executives in SOEs, whereas privately controlled firms are also likely
to build up political connections or maintain their previous connections if their firms
were converted from former state owned enterprises. These connections benefit private
firms by providing preferential access to financial resources such as loans and help them
avoid strict regulatory oversight (Dinc, 2005; Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008).
In addition, China is a transitional economy with weak law enforcement and weak
institutional constraints. The state is involved in many Chinese companies which are
believed to operate with low efficiency (Wei et al., 2005) and have poor corporate
governance (Firth et al., 2006b). Thus, whether CEOs are disciplined appropriately and
monitored effectively is still an open question. The Chinese context provides me with
an excellent laboratory to examine and explain the effects of CEO political connections
on corporate governance systems, particularly the sensitivity between CEO turnover and
firm performance.
From a comprehensive sample of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms, this thesis
found a significantly negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance
that is much stronger in privately controlled firms than in SOEs. As with previous
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studies (Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2010), this thesis defined
political connection where CEOs were former or are current officers affiliated to the
government, and identified that nearly 45% of the CEOs in the sample are politically
connected in some way, of which 34.55% are in SOEs, and 10.45% are in privately
controlled firms. This thesis provides strong empirical evidence that CEOs are less
likely to be replaced if they were politically connected, and even stronger when in
privately controlled firms. This thesis also found that managerial ownership was
inversely related to CEO turnover. Among those CEOs with managerial ownership,
those that are politically connected exhibit a significantly weaker turnover-performance
relationship than their non-connected peers.
My findings indicate that a CEO’s political connection can serve as a substitute
disciplinary mechanism by lowering their sensitivity of turnover to firm performance.
The evidence clearly suggests that politically connected CEOs are more entrenched and
more likely to retain their positions when firms are not performing well.
This research contributes to the extant literature on corporate governance by
providing a comprehensive analysis of CEO turnover performance in China, and by
offering the first empirical findings on whether political connections affect CEO
turnover. Political connections provide an effective way for CEOs to entrench
themselves in corporate governance.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
review of extant literature. Section 3 lists detailed hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the
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data and research methods. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 presents my
conclusions.
2.2 Literature review
The turnover of top executives has been the main topic of discussion within the
corporate governance area. International evidence shows that replacing top executives is
an alternative mechanism to disciplining them for under-performing because their
turnover is often associated with poor firm performance and low managerial ownership
(Kaplan, 1994a, 1994b; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Franks et al., 2001; Conyon and
Florou, 2002; Volpin, 2002). Specifically, Weisbach (1988) found that poor firm
performance is related to forced CEO turnover. Huson et al. (2001), using U.S. data
from 1971 to 1994, found that changes to the mechanism of internal governance and
intensity of the takeover market were not associated with CEO turnover and sensitivity
to firm performance. Denis et al. (1997) provided evidence that CEO turnover was
negatively related to the ownership stake held by officers and directors, and positively
related to the presence of an outside blockholder.
Several studies in China also examined top executive turnover and its relationship to
firm performance (Groves et al., 1995; Aivazian et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007; Cheng et
al., 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009). Among these studies, Kato and Long (2006) showed
that CEO turnover was negatively related to a firm’s financial performance, and Firth et
al. (2006b) provided a similar result by focusing on the relationship between chairman
turnover and firm performance. Moreover, Conyon and He (2008) examined both CEO
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and chairman turnover using a sample of 1200 Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2006.
They found that the turnovers of top management were inversely related to a firm’s
profitability, which was consistent with the agency model. In this analysis I focused on
CEO turnover by following Kato and Long (2006) and Conyon and He (2008).
Two different sets of evidence were provided in studies that examined the function
of political connections. The first was that political connections can benefit firms by
relaxing tax regulations, preferential corporate bailout, convenient financing, and
facilitating rent seeking (Faccio et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010).
These studies suggest that political connections have a positive effect on firm value and
performance. The second argues that politically connected firms also have to devote
substantial resources to their rent seeking activities, which may well eliminate any
advantage gained from any existing political connections (Fan et al., 2007; Faccio,
2010). They treat political connections as government intervention and a desire to
satisfy the objectives of social services. The evolving studies on China provided both
sets of evidence. The study of Fan et al. (2007) from a sample of IPO firms from 1993
to 2001, mainly focused on the intervention of political connections and argued that
politically connected firms under performed more than those without political
connections,. Li et al. (2008) used a sample of China’s privately controlled listed firms
and provided evidence that politically connected CEOs have a positive effect on firm
performance.
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Previous studies have not examined the effect of political connections on CEO
turnover so this research hopes to shed some light on this issue by using a sample of all
the non-financial firms listed in two Chinese stock exchanges.

2.3 Institutional background and hypotheses
For the last thirty years China has adopted economic reforms and SOE restructuring.
Decision making rights have been decentralized from government to firm level while
the state still controls many SOEs, particularly the appointment of top managerial
positions in state controlled firms, even though the state relinquished control in some
areas. Thus, political intervention has a significant impact on the corporate governance
systems. Moreover, as many studies argued, the state is not the real owner of SOEs but
the agents of government acting on behalf of the government. Therefore, it is natural
that state shareholders have multiple objectives rather than the traditional agency model
of maximizing firm value. How to monitor top management and whether the current
internal monitoring mechanism is effective needs to be examined.
In the early 1990s, some SOEs were allowed to issue shares and trade on the two
stock exchanges set up in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The motivation behind this
corporatization and privatization process was the government’s desire to adopt a market
oriented economic system. In this sense, CEOs were acting more like their counterparts
in western countries by maximizing shareholder wealth. The agency theory argues that
CEOs are more likely to be terminated or replaced due to poor firm performance, which
suggests a negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The
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relationship between CEO replacement and poor firm performance has been proved by
many previous studies from China (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006b; Chang and
Wong, 2009). From this therefore, this thesis constructed the first hypothesis:
H1: CEO turnover is negatively related to firm performance.
The evolving literature has studied political connections extensively (Li et al., 2008;
Wu et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010). They suggest that political connections can be either
in SOEs or privately controlled firms. A unique characteristic of Chinese SOEs is the
existence of a politically controlled personnel system where government at different
levels have the ultimate authority over the appointment and dismissal of many top
executives, which directly results in politically connected CEOs. Moreover, one feature
of SOE reform was the separation of government functions from enterprise management,
from which many government officials chose to take up managerial positions in
enterprises rather than their original positions in the government.
Alternatively, since the Chinese market is apparently underdeveloped and inefficient,
and lacking protection for outside investors, privately controlled firms have incentives
to establish political connections to extract rents from the government and obtain relief
from some of their problems (Faccio, 2010). There were two waves of political
connections established in privately controlled firms that mainly consisted of politically
connected CEOs. The first wave happened as early as the 1990’s, just after Deng
Xiaoping’s inspection of south China, when many government officials chose to
become self-employed and established their own businesses. The second wave referred
to the fact that during the early 2000’s, some government officials gave up their original
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positions and held posts in privately controlled firms. Furthermore, privately controlled
firms would also like to appoint politically connected CEOs, especially when they
encounter financial distress (Li et al., 2006). This political connection in privately
controlled firms is regarded as a resource and protection from the government which
can help improve firm performance and overcome state or market failure (Li et al.,
2008). Consequently, private investors are more likely to retain their politically
connected CEO’s to maintain their power and performance. Therefore, due to the
benefits resulting from political connections, this thesis conjectures that politically
connected CEOs are entrenched and less likely to be dismissed:
H2: CEO turnover rate is negatively related to CEO political connection.
As discussed above, politically connected CEOs are less likely to be terminated,
which suggests there is a weaker relationship between CEO turnover and firm
performance. In addition, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Committee of State Council (SASAC), the agent of the government, issued a regulation
‘Interim regulations on the evaluation of the SOE affiliated to the central government
top executive operating performance’ mentioning the ‘talking system’ which referred to
the fact that if SOEs controlled by the SASAC performed poorly, the top executives
would not be punished or dismissed immediately. The SASAC will send experts to help
these SOEs overcome their failure to perform (SASAC, 2003). A similar situation exists
in SOEs controlled by the local SASAC. Moreover, because these politically connected
CEOs are more likely to act as representatives of the government, they care more about
the growth of the state owned assets invested in SOEs, and other objectives such as the
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supply of labour and a region’s budgetary deficit (Chang and Wong, 2009).
Additionally, politically connected CEOs in privately controlled firms have a closer
relationship with the government and always perform better than their peers without
political connections. Moreover, private investors are motivated to retain all of the
benefits arising from their political connections and are less likely to dismiss politically
connected CEOs, even they underperform. Therefore, a political connection will lead to
a weaker turnover performance relationship:
H3: CEO turnover performance relationship is weaker if the CEO is politically
connected.
State owned firms operate with multiple objectives such as providing a social
service, not just focusing on maximizing firm value (Clarke, 2003). In this sense, CEO
turnover in state owned firms may also be determined by some other indicators.
Nevertheless, private investors appoint CEOs as their representatives to maximize
shareholder wealth which means that private controlling shareholders have enough
incentives to monitor top management and dismiss them for poor performance (Firth et
al., 2006b). Therefore, this research has the following hypothesis:
H4: CEO turnover performance relationship is weaker in SOEs but stronger in
privately controlled firms.
The last hypothesis related to managerial ownership of politically connected CEOs.
In many cases, firms award CEOs some equity to better align managerial behavior with
the interests of shareholders, because doing so can help increase firm value (Hu and
Zhou, 2008; Benson and Davidson, 2009). Therefore, in order to fully utilize the
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convenience resulting from political connections, politically connected CEOs are more
entrenched and less likely to be removed because they may have a close relationship
with their firms:
H5: CEO turnover performance relationship is weaker if politically connected
CEOs are holding managerial ownership.
2.4 Sample selection and research methods
2.4.1 Sample selection
This thesis was able to obtain information on specific CEO characteristics from the
Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, and firm specific
characteristics from the SinoFin database. The original sample consisted of every firm
listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2002 to 2007. This thesis
started the sample from 2002 because the new accounting and audit standards have been
exercised in listed firms since 2001. As with previous studies, this study deleted ST and
*ST 3 firms from my population. To address the specifically regulated industry
considerations, this study excluded those financial industry firms with unique
accounting standards, and observations with missing information. The final sample
consists of 1096 listed firms and 6297 firm year observations. Table 2.1 gives detailed
information on CEO turnover; the total number of which was 1422. It also gives
detailed information on the destination of departing CEOs.

3

ST stands for special treatment. The stock exchanges flag a listed firm ST when irregularities appear in its
financial or accounting statements. These firms also have negative net profits for two consecutive years.
*ST refers to listed firms that have negative net profits for three consecutive years and have a high
probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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This study manually collected data of CEO political connections by searching the
annual reports of listed firms. For each firm in each year, this thesis compiled a CEO
profile that includes age, gender, education, experience, and professional background.
From this I traced their political connections by examining whether they were former or
current officers of either the central government, local government, the military, or
members of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the
standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC).
It was difficult to distinguish between forced and voluntary turnovers based on
public information because the press was unlikely to mention whether CEO turnover
was or was not forced. Therefore, in order to effectively monitor CEO turnover as a
punishment related to poor firm performance, this study adopted the following
procedure. This study was able to obtain the reasons for CEO turnover from the
CSMAR database and divided them into ‘normal’ and ‘forced’ groups for ease of
exposition. This study first identified that the normal turnover group included 745 cases
where the stated reasons were retirement, contract expiration, resignation, completion of
acting duties, health, personal reasons, changes in controlling shareholder, legal
disputes, and corporate governance reform. For the remaining turnovers, this study
traced the destinations of departing CEOs to identify either normal or forced turnovers.
Of the remaining 677 cases, this study recognized 225 cases which were considered to
be normal turnovers. These include 10 cases where CEOs took up positions in the
government, 92 cases where they were promoted to chairman or vice chairman of
24

boards, 51 cases where they took up managerial positions in parent companies, 70 cases
where they remained as chairman or vice chairman, and 2 cases where they were going
abroad to receive an education.
This thesis treated the remaining 452 cases as forced turnovers. These include 94
cases where CEOs took up less prestigious positions within firms, 22 cases where they
left and took up a position in unlisted or smaller firms, 42 cases where they were
dismissed, and 294 cases in which were unable to trace the destinations of those who
left or unknown reasons for turnovers. This thesis classified cases where no reason was
given for a forced turnover because there were comprehensive reasons why CEO’s
departed so it was unlikely that information on turnover was not available if CEO
turnover was a voluntary departure. Moreover, Firth et al. (2006b) argued that
resignation may be a face saving device for CEOs who would otherwise be punished or
dismissed so this thesis reclassified resignations as forced turnovers. Of the original
sample of forced turnovers, this study excluded 31 cases where their tenure was less
than one year because poor performance in one year would be unlikely. This study also
added 20 cases where the stated reason was retirement, but the age of departing CEOs
was less than 60. Finally, this study identified 981 cases as normal turnovers and 441 as
forced turnovers, which represent 68.99% and 31.01% of the total turnovers,
respectively.
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2.4.2 Methodology
This study used the following logistic regression to examine the effects of political
connection on CEO turnover and turnover performance relationship.
Turnoverit =
α 0 + α1 Perfit −1 + α 2 Politicalit + α 3 Perf it −1 * Politicalit + α 4 Mownit
+ α 5 Mownit * Politicalit + α 6 Private + α 7 Privateit * Politicalit
+ α 8 Sizeit + α 9 Ageit + α10Tenureit + α11 Boardit + α12 Pondit

(1)

+ α13 Levit + α14 Dualityit + Industy + Year + ε it
where Turnover is measured by forced turnover, as discussed above, which can reflect
the effectiveness of CEO monitoring mechanisms. Perf is firm performance, measured
as the return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). Political is a dummy variable,
coded 1 if a CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. Size means firm size, defined
as the log of firm total assets. Age is the log of CEO age. Tenure is the log of years that
a CEO has been in that position. Board is the log of the total number of directors on the
boards. Pond is the proportion of independent directors on the boards. Lev is the level of
firm leverage. Duality is a dummy variable coded 1 where a CEO is also the chairman
of the board and 0 otherwise. This study also includes i and t representing the industry
and year to control the industry and year fixed effects 4.
Following Huson et al. (2001) and Chang and Wong (2009), this study used the
current year performance if CEO turnover occurred in the second half of a year and
previous year performance if it occurred in the first half of a year. By doing so, this
study partially covered the endogeneity issue.

4

The statistical softwares used in this thesis for the empirical analysis include STATA and Eviews.
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2.4.3 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 summarizes the summary statistics of variables for this study. Panel A
shows that the rate of total turnover was 23% which is similar to those reported by the
previous studies. This study also used a set of control variables in the regression. The
average tenure of CEOs was 3.26 years, which is longer than the one reported by Chang
and Wong (2009). The mean value of CEO duality indicates that 12% of the total
observations have CEOs who also serve as chairman of their firms. The results in Panel
B show that there was a significant decrease in the annual turnover rate during the
sample, decreasing from 27.42% in 2002 to 20.63% in 2007. The average annual
turnover rate was 22.82%. The results also show that normal turnover accounts for the
majority, around 70%, of total turnovers. As discussed above, forced turnovers were
due to poor performance which reflected the disciplinary power of the internal
monitoring mechanism, while normal turnovers includes retirement, health problems,
promotions, moving laterally, and taking up other prestigious positions.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Univariate tests
Table 2.3 shows the turnover rates by quartiles of firm performance of the full sample
and tests for equality between the lowest and highest quartiles. This study divided firms
into four quartiles based on industry adjusted ROA in Panel A and industry adjusted
ROS in Panel B. The results show that CEO forced turnover rates increased as firm
performance decreased. The results in Panel A show that forced turnover is significantly
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higher in firms with poor ROA than those with good ROA. In Panel B poor ROS is
associated with forced turnovers, for example those firms with the poorest ROA
(bottom quartile) replace their CEOs in 9.39 percent of cases whereas only 4.57 percent
of CEOs were replaced for firms with highest ROA, and this difference of 4.82 (9.394.57) percent is significant (t-test value is 5.35). The general results support my
hypothesis that forced CEO turnover is positively related to poor firm performance.
Table 2.4 shows the results of the univariate tests of CEO turnover. This study divided
the total sample of firms into two groups, with and without political connections, and
then sorted them based on performance and managerial ownership, to see whether the
rate of CEO turnover had significant differences. In Panel A, Table 2.4 for example, this
study divided the total sample into two sub-samples based on industry adjusted ROA.
For firms with a higher firm performance, the CEO turnover rate was 4.80% in
politically connected firms, which was significantly lower than 6.32% in non-politically
connected firms (t-value is -1.92). This study then repeated the comparative analysis by
sorting firms based on industry adjusted ROS and obtained similar results to those
reported in Table 2.4. The overall evidence suggests that politically connected CEOs
were less likely to be replaced but the political connections in firms with managerial
ownership further weakened the performance turnover relationship. These results are
basically consistent with the main hypotheses.
Table 2.5 lists further results of the comparison of mean (median) value of CEO
turnover, firm, and CEO characteristics. The results between two groups based on
whether CEOs are politically connected are shown in Panel A. In column 1, CEO
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turnover is significantly lower for firms with CEO political connections (t-value is 2.06), and so too is firm performance (t-value is -5.84). The results between SOEs and
privately controlled firms are shown in Panel B. The comparison of CEO turnover is
insignificant, which indicates there is no difference in turnover between SOEs and
privately controlled firms, although the average performance in SOEs is better than
privately controlled firms. The results also suggest that CEOs in SOEs work for a longer
time and are older than their counterparts in privately controlled firms (t-values are 4.27
and 12.36, respectively). The results shown in Panel C are between two groups with and
without CEO turnover. The general comparison results suggest that CEO and firm
characteristics between these two groups do not have significant difference except firm
size and CEO tenure.
2.5.2 Multivariate tests
As Table 2.6 shows, the Pearson correlations between each pair of variables
(contemporaneous value) are lower, which indicates that multicollinearity does not exist.
Table 2.7 shows the logistic regression estimated results of CEO political connections
on the performance turnover relationship for the whole sample which basically supports
my hypotheses. In Panel A of Table 2.7, industry adjusted ROA was used to measure
firm performance and industry adjusted ROS was used in Panel B of Table 2.7. The
general results in Table 2.7 show that a firm’s poor performance was definitely related
to CEO turnover, a result consistent with the evidence in Table 2.3, and supports
hypothesis 1 that poor performing CEOs are more likely to be replaced.
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CEO’s political connections are negatively associated with CEO turnover while the
results are not robust in all specifications. The evidence here supports hypothesis 2 that
CEOs with political connections are generally less likely to be replaced. The interactive
term between firm performance and political connection remains positive and
significant at the 1% level in all specifications, which strongly supports hypothesis 3
that political connections lower the sensitivity of CEO’s performance and turnover. This
offers new evidence in the literature that political connections help entrench poorly
performing CEOs. Mown, the proportion of shares held by CEOs is negatively
associated with CEO turnover but the coefficient is insignificant. The interactive term
between Mown and political connection, however, is negatively associated with CEO
turnover, which suggests that politically connected CEOs, particularly those with more
ownership equity, are less likely to be replaced. Similarly, the interactive term between
political connection and private firm dummy has a negative coefficient. CEOs in
privately controlled firms with political connections are less likely to be replaced than
those in state owned firms. One possible explanation for this is that CEOs with political
connections bring benefits to privately controlled firms and hence have a lower rate of
turnover.
Control variables such as age had a positive effect on turnover, while tenure had a
negative effect, although corporate governance variables such as the size of a board and
proportion of independent directors, including duality, had no effect on turnover. Unlike
previous studies this thesis does not find any relationship between firm size and
leverage, and CEO turnover.
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As discussed above, this study repeated the analysis by including resignation as
forced turnover. Both univariate and multivariate analyses using the new forced
turnover are broadly similar to those reported here.
2.5.3 Robust Analysis
The analyses so far have concentrated on using annual firm performance as the
criteria for replacing top management and the results support the hypotheses that CEO
turnover is associated with poor firm performance. My argument is that CEOs may
focus on short term performance and have an incentive to manipulate cash flows and
earnings (Chang and Wong, 2009). However, as the summary statistics have shown,
their average tenure is 3.26 years, and this thesis suspects that using annual performance
may not completely reflect a CEO’s ability or contribution. Because a bad firm
performance could have resulted from risks such as policy, changes in regulation, and
macro-economic factors. Therefore, this study created two additional performance
measures, AROA (AROS) and DROA (DROS). AROA (AROS) is the average industry
adjusted ROA (ROS) over a CEO’s tenure, and DROA (DROS) is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if a firm’s ROA (ROS) is higher than the median ROA (ROS) and 0
otherwise. This study replaced annual firm performance with these two additional
measures, re-estimated main regression and found results that were broadly similar to
those reported in Table 2.7.
Political connection is not completely exogenous, since certain firms, e.g., poorly
performing ones, may be more likely to hire CEOs with political connections. This
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research needed to control this endogeneity in the multivariate analysis. Table 2.8
reports the results of the two stage regression. In the first stage this study used a logistic
model to obtain fitted values of the political connection dummy by regressing it on firm
performance, and a set of selected control variables. In the second stage the fitted values
were used instead of the political connection dummy in regressions that are otherwise
the same as those reported in Table 2.7. By doing so this thesis could control the
selection of CEOs with political connections, while the second stage regression used the
predicted probability of political connection as a variable of interest.
The general results of the two stage regression are similar to the OLS regression,
although some variables were less significant in the 2SLS regression. For example, the
interactive terms of ROA and political connection remain significant and positive,
suggesting that political connection reduced the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm
performance.
2.6 Post turnover performance
2.6.1 Comparisons between politically and non-politically connected firms
The previous results suggest that CEO turnover is related to poor firm performance
and replacing incumbent CEOs is expected to improve profitability and performance
when firms encounter some financial distress. The results further suggest that this
relationship is different across firms with and without politically connected CEOs.
Therefore, this thesis takes advantage of the sample to examine whether changes in
performance surrounding CEO turnover are different between these two groups.
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Table 2.9 shows the univariate tests of the changes in firm performance surrounding
the turnover of politically connected and non-politically connected CEO groups. This
study summarized the mean and median of industry adjusted ROA and ROS from three
years before to three years after CEO turnover (year t indicates the year when CEO
turnover occurred, year t-1 indicates one year before CEO turnover, and year t+1
indicates one year after CEO turnover).
For the politically connected CEOs group in Panel A, the mean (median) ROA shows
a decline from three years before replacement up to year t when a CEO was replaced.
After their replacement, mean (median) ROA increased steadily all through the
following three years reaching 1.63 (2.41) in year t+3. The summary results for ROS
have a similar trend to those of ROA: the mean (median) ROS has been decreasing from
three years before CEO turnover and began to increase after CEO turnover reached 2.47
(3.83) in year t+3. For the non-politically connected CEOs group in Penal B, mean
(median) of both ROA and ROS were decreasing from year t-3 to year t and began to
increase to 2.35 (3.02) and 3.63 (4.55) in year t+3, respectively. The evidence indicates
that CEO turnover is associated with poor firm performance and can help improve post
turnover performance.
However, this study is concerned about the difference between firms with and
without politically connected CEOs. This study compared firm performance between
the t-3 group, t group, and t+3 group, and also compared average firm performance
before CEO turnover and t group, and average firm performance after CEO turnover
and t group, for two groups of firms with and without politically connected CEOs. The
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results of these comparisons shown in Panel C in Table 2.9 are for firms with politically
connected CEOs, indicating that mean (median) ROA has dropped marginally by 1.83
(0.71) percent (t-value is 1.67). After the CEO has been replaced the mean (median)
ROA increased to 1.63 (2.41) which was higher than those of t group but insignificant
(t-value is -1.08). The comparison of average firm performance shows consistent
evidence that the CEO was replaced due to poor firm performance, and average firm
performance increased significantly afterwards (t-value is -1.95). The comparison of
ROS has similar results to those of ROA but the range was higher. Mean (median) ROS
decreased by 7.34 (1.76) percent from t-3 to t (t-value is 1.99), and increased by 4.92
(1.42) percent from t to t+3 (t-value is -1.14).
The results of the comparison shown in Panel D in Table 2.9 are for firms without
politically connected CEOs. The results indicate that the mean (median) ROA was
reduced by 2.56 (0.73) percent significantly (t-value is 2.38), and increased by 2.25
(1.08) in year t+3 (t-value is -1.96). Average firm performance before and after CEO
turnover was significantly higher than the year t group (t-values are 2.16 and -1.96,
respectively). The comparison of ROS shows a broadly similar trend to the comparison
of ROA.
The overall evidence is consistent with my conjecture and regression results, which
reflects the effectiveness of management monitoring and a weakened turnoverperformance relationship in firms where a CEO is politically connected. More important,
the results also show that post turnover performance in non-politically connected firms
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was better than in politically connected firms which suggests an entrenchment effect
exists with politically connected CEOs.
Besides the above univariate tests, this study also applied the following regression to
test the effect of political connection on firm performance after CEO replacement, using
the sample of firms where CEO turnover occurs:
∆Perfit =
α 0 + α1 Politicalit + α 2 Sizeit + α 3 Boardit + α 4 Pondit
+ α 5 Levit + α 6 Ageit + α 7Tenureit + ε it

(2)

where ∆Perf is the change of firm performance that used in the above univariate tests.
This measurement was chosen because this study was concerned about the improvement
in firm performance after CEO replacement and wanted to examine whether firm
performance increased with CEO turnover. All other variables are defined the same as
those in equation (1). The results of the estimation are shown in Table 2.10.
In Table 2.10, this study reported the results where the dependent variable was
measured as the difference of firm performance between the average of year t+1, t+2
and t+3 and year t 5. The general multivariate results 6 suggest that for listed firms where
CEOs are politically connected, post turnover improvement in performance was less
significant than for firms without politically connected CEOs.
2.6.2 Turnover and non-turnover comparison
This study was also interested in comparing the post turnover performance within
politically connected firms. Table 2.11 shows the univariate tests of changes in firm
5

I also apply other three firm performance measures, namely the difference of firm performance between year t+3
and t, t-3 and t, and average of (t-3, t-1) and t. The results using these three variables are consistent with the above
univariate tests.
6
The general multivariate results mean the results from the multiple linear regression.
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performance surrounding CEO turnover between firms with and without CEO turnover 7.
Consistent with the univariate tests in Section 2.6.1, this thesis summarized the mean
and median of both industry adjusted ROA and ROS from three years before CEO
turnover to three years after. .
For politically connected firms without CEO turnover in Panel B Table 2.11, the
mean (median) ROA remains positive before the turnover and dropped to negative after
the turnover, and the mean (median) ROS shows a similar trend. This thesis tested the
equality of the changes in firm performance surrounding CEO turnover and reported the
results in Panel D. The comparison results indicate that firm performance is not
significantly different across the years for groups of firms without CEO turnover, while
the results for groups of firms with CEO turnover indicate that firm performance
increased significantly after they were replaced. .
This thesis also compared the changes of firm performance between these two
groups and the results are shown in Panel E Table 2.11. The difference test results in
Panel E suggest that an increase in firm performance of firms with CEO turnover was
significantly higher than those firms without CEO turnover. Together with the evidence
from the summary statistics of politically connected firms with CEO turnover, the
results indicate that the CEO monitoring mechanism is effective in politically connected
firms. More important, the overall evidence suggests an entrenchment effect of
politically connected CEOs, i.e. politically connected CEOs will retain their managerial

7
In order to match the samples, for the group of firms without CEO turnover, I assume there is a ‘CEO turnover’
happened when CEO tenure is four (because the average tenure for CEOs is 3.26). I also tried three years as a
robustness tests.
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positions even if they underperformed. However, once politically connected CEOs were
replaced, their post turnover performance improved significantly.
To provide supportive evidence, this thesis applied the following regression to
examine the effect of political connection on post performance after CEO turnover
using the sample of firms with political connection:
∆Perfit =
α 0 + α1Turnoverit + α 2 Sizeit + α 3 Boardit + α 4 Pondit
+ α 5 Levit + α 6 Ageit + α 7Tenureit + ε it

(3)

where Turnover is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a CEO was replaced and 0 otherwise.
All other variables are defined the same as in equation (2). The regression results are
reported in Table 2.12. The general results indicate that CEO turnover in politically
connected firms can improve firm performance more significantly than firms without
CEO turnover.
2.7 Conclusion
China is the greatest transitional economy in which political intervention and
influence often have important implications on social and economic activity. Political
connection of CEOs in state-owned firms or privately controlled firms is sometimes
argued for securing protection of property rights but also as a major source of rent
seeking. Due to the lack of legal protection for investors, minority shareholders often
have limited influence on management. The internal monitoring mechanism, especially
CEO turnover therefore plays an important role in disciplining management. This thesis
therefore examined the effect of CEO political connection on corporate governance,
focusing particularly on the CEO turnover and turnover-performance relationship.
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This research is the first to provide empirical evidence that CEO political connection
has a substantial impact on CEO turnover and the relationship between turnover and
firm performance. This analysis also provides evidence for the differential effect that
political connection has for SOEs and privately controlled firms.
Using a large sample of China’s listed firms, this thesis found that CEO turnover is
associated with poor firm performance, and such turnover-performance sensitivity is
stronger in privately controlled firms compared to state-owned ones. This thesis
documents that political connection has a negative effect on CEO turnover. This
suggests that political connection reduces the likelihood of CEOs being replaced.
Furthermore, the evidence shows political connection lowers the sensitivity of turnover
to performance. This finding indicates a substitution effect on internal disciplinary
mechanisms by making poor quality CEOs with political background more entrenched.
In addition, privately controlled firms are more likely to retain politically connected
CEOs relative to SOEs. The performance turnover relationship of politically connected
CEOs is much weaker if they hold managerial ownership. Following forced turnover of
CEOs, firm performance ex post improves, especially for CEOs without political
connection.
The overall evidence suggests that in an emerging economy, political connections
have a significant influence on corporate governance. Political connections have an
undesirable management entrenchment effect by adversely affecting internal monitoring
mechanisms.
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Chapter 3: Political promotion, CEO incentives, and the relationship between
pay and performance

3.1 Introduction
A number of papers argue that government intervention in business activities is
motivated by rent extraction (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny,
1994; Shleifer, 1998). The potential for government intervention is particularly high in
China where the state is often (directly or indirectly) the largest shareholder and where
the central government retains ultimate control of personnel in the corporate sector.
Because the government has the right to appoint the CEOs of many listed SOEs, these
CEOs often have implicit political aspirations as well as an explicit role as a CEO. To
the extent that political promotion is based largely on non-economic factors, then
incentives for promotion may interfere with any incentives to maximize firm value.
Consistent with this “grabbing hand” view of state intervention, Fan et al. (2007)
document that Chinese listed SOEs with politically connected CEOs have lower stock
returns, earnings and sales growth compared to firms without politically connected
CEOs.
An alternative view however, is that the central government values strong economic
performance. Consistent with this view, Qian and Xu (1993) found a significantly
positive correlation between the change in a region’s economic performance and a
change in its political position. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2005) document a positive
relationship between the likelihood of a provincial leader being promoted within the
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government and their regional economic performance. Also, as noted by Li (1998),
starting in the early 1980s, the central government mandated that almost all bureaucrats
at various levels should be familiar with capitalist ideas. Hence, in China’s SOEs, top
managers are often in a selection and evaluation process for bureaucratic promotion.
Under this view, incentives for political promotion will also provide strong incentives
for CEOs to maximize firm value.
This thesis empirically investigated the implicit incentives arising from political
connections and conjectured that CEOs in China’s SOEs face limited outside job
opportunities and are therefore more concerned about assessment by government
officials than with options in the managerial labor market, especially given that political
promotion carries higher payment and more prestige, thus providing managers with
strong incentives to increase their probability of political promotion (Groves et al., 1995;
Li and Zhou, 2005; Bo, 2009).
With respect to compensation policy, Groves et al. (1995) provide evidence that
managerial pay began to exhibit a stronger link to profits and a weaker link to sales
following the initial reforms of Chinese SOEs undertaken by the government in the
1980’s. Consistent with the predictions of agency theory, Mengistae and Xu (2004)
found that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to performance was decreasing in the
variance of the performance measures and increasing in the marginal return to executive
action. Firth et al. (2006a) also found that pay responds positively to performance in
Chinese SOEs, but argue that the implied pay-performance sensitivities are too low to
provide meaningful incentives.
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This study expanded on this literature by examining the link between political
promotion and firm performance and how promotion incentives interact with
compensation policy in China’s SOEs, from which this study reports two main findings.
First, the likelihood of a CEO receiving a political promotion is positively related to
firm performance, which is not consistent with the view that political incentives are
misaligned with maximizing value. Second, this study shows that the positive
relationship between pay and firm performance weakens when the CEO has a higher
likelihood of political promotion. This finding is consistent with the idea that incentives
for political promotion are a substitute for explicit compensation incentives, as
predicted by models of career concerns (Baker et al., 1988; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992;
Brickley et al., 1999; Gillan et al., 2009). These results do not appear to be driven by
reverse causation—namely the idea that bureaucrats appoint colleagues that they would
like to promote to manage better performing firms, nor by differences in CEOs that are
originally hired from within versus from outside the firm.
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this research
provides new evidence on the importance of politically based career concerns that
provide incentives by exploiting the unique institutional environment of Chinese SOEs.
Although several studies document a link between managerial turnover and
performance in Chinese SOEs (Groves et al., 1995; Firth et al., 2006b; Hu and Leung,
2008), with the exception of Bo (2009), none of them focus on the determinants of
political promotion. Second, this research adds to the understanding of how, in an
institutional environment with weak corporate governance, alternative mechanisms
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based on political incentives can provide executives with sufficient motivation, and
ultimately enhance the performance and growth of the state economy. In doing so, the
results provide one explanation for the strong performance of Chinese firms despite the
low-powered monetary incentives given to CEOs. Finally, this research adds to
literature that examines the role of political connections more generally (e.g. Faccio,
2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008). This research points
out both the costs and benefits of political connections. Benefits include protection from
the central government and easy access to preferential treatment like bank loans and raw
materials, lighter taxation, and relaxed regulations. 8 Costs include rent extraction by
bureaucrats and entrenched managers. The overall analysis further suggests that care
should be taken when evaluating the role of government intervention in business
activities.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 describes the incentive structure and develops our hypotheses. Section 4
presents the data sample and methodology. Section 5 outlines the empirical results and
Section 6 reports the robustness tests. Section 7 concludes the paper.

8

In the Chinese context, Li et al. (2006) suggest that private entrepreneurs are more likely to enter

politics when market institutions are relatively underdeveloped, suggesting that, for private firms in China,
the benefits of access outweigh the costs.
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3.2 Literature review
A number of other studies have examined various aspects of corporate governance
in China. Groves et al. (1995) provide evidence that the reform of Chinese SOEs
undertaken by the government in the 1980s resulted in the initial development of
incentive systems suggestive of competitive western labour markets. Specifically, they
found that after the reforms, managers of SOEs tended to be promoted (demoted)
following good (poor) firm performance and that pay began to exhibit a stronger link to
profits and a weaker link to sales. Mengistae and Xu (2004) found that the sensitivity of
CEO compensation to performance was decreasing in the variance of the performance
measures and increasing in the marginal return to executive action. Firth et al. (2006a)
also found that pay responds to performance in Chinese SOEs, but that the link between
pay and performance is weaker for SOEs controlled by the state. Firth et al. (2006b)
found that managerial turnover was negatively related to profitability but unrelated to
stock returns, and that sensitivity of turnover to performance was higher if legal entities
are the major shareholders. Hu and Leung (2008) found that a state owner was more
likely to replace top executives and appoint a politically connected CEO when SOEs
encountered economic distress, and performance improved following their appointment.
In China, where most CEOs of SOEs were selected, appointed, and dismissed by
government personnel departments, politically appointed CEOs and top executives
might also consider their political careers. Similar to us, Bo (2009) argued that the
potential for political promotion motivates CEOs to work hard and the need to improve
an enterprise’s economic performance motivates the government to set up political
43

motivations. In a related study, Qian and Xu (1993) found a significantly positive
correlation between a change in economic performance and a change in a region’s
political position. Similarly, Li and Zhou (2005) document a positive relationship
between the likelihood of a provincial leader being promoted and their regional
economic performance. All such evidence illustrates the effects that political career
concerns have on economic performance.
More generally, the role of political connections has been studied extensively (e.g.
Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008). In the Chinese
context, Li et al. (2006) suggested that private entrepreneurs were more likely to enter
politics when market institutions were relatively underdeveloped, suggesting that, for
private firms, the benefits of access outweigh the costs.

3.3 Institutional background and hypotheses
3.3.1 Managerial compensation in China’s listed firms
Before the introduction of China’s economic reforms in 1978, SOE managers were
representatives of a central government that maintained complete control over the
activities of state controlled firms. More specifically, SOE managers were bureaucrats
appointed directly by the central government personnel department. During this period,
all profits realized by SOEs were repatriated to the central government and managers
were paid according to the highly structured civil service pay scale, whose variations
reflected only wage differences across regions, industries, and position within the firm.
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In the early stages of the reforms, which began in 1978, CEO pay was still
constrained by the equality or near equality of pay differentials between top executives
and workers (Firth et al., 2006a). In 1985, however, the Ministry of Labor suggested
that CEO pay be linked to firm economic performance, but this did not prove to be
significant managerial incentives because SOEs were still under the previous system
where profits were redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). Beginning with privatization
in the early 1990s and the establishment of two stock exchanges in Shanghai and
Shenzhen, there has been a gradual introduction of performance based pay systems
(Groves et al., 1995; Mengistae and Xu, 2004). In particular, the establishment of the
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(SASAC) in 2003 has strengthened the pay-performance relationship in SOEs and many
regulations have been promulgated by SASAC to motivate CEOs who report to the
central government with performance based pay schemes. For example, the SASAC
issued “Interim regulations on the evaluation of the top executive operating
performance” in 2003, describing how to evaluate executive performance and including
a requirement that a CEO should resign if they fail to perform, and updated these
regulations in 2006, and again in 2010. Meanwhile, local SASACs also issued
regulations similar to those promulgated by the central SASAC to encourage the use of
performance based incentives in the SOEs that reported to local governments. For
example, the Beijing SASAC promulgated Interim regulations on the administration of
top executive pay in Beijing’s SOEs in 2004 (Beijing SASAC, 2004). Based on the
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discussion above and the results of previous research this study conjectures the
following:
H1: CEO pay is positively related to firm performance.
3.3.2 China’s politically controlled personnel system and political promotion
With the corporatization and privatization of SOEs in China beginning in 1978,
many decision rights associated with running a firm, such as decisions regarding profit
retention and profit sharing schemes, have shifted from the state level to firm level
(Firth et al., 2006a). Nevertheless, although the state has decentralized authority in most
aspects, it retains control over personnel decisions and has ultimate authority over the
selection, appointment, and dismissal of top SOE executives (Fan et al., 2007).
Specifically, in SOEs affiliated with the central government, this decision is in the
hands of SASAC, while in other SOEs it has been decentralized to local SASACs (Chan,
2004; Bo, 2009).
One characteristic that distinguishes China from other economies is an additional
layer in the managerial labour market, namely the internal political labour market. In the
U.S., for example, Baker et al. (1988) argued that CEOs typically stand at the top of the
corporate hierarchy which eliminates internal promotion incentives, whereas CEOs in
Chinese SOEs are appointed by the state, and opportunities outside the managerial
labour market are limited (Li and Zhou, 2005; Bo, 2009). In addition to discharging
their fiduciary duties, these CEOs are also concerned about any assessment from
government officials that allows them to climb the political ladder (Groves et al., 1995;
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Firth et al., 2006b). Promotion within the political arena brings reputation, more
prestige, and other implicit compensation. As part of the reform process, China has
stressed the importance of economic development (Qian and Xu, 1993; Allen et al.,
2005; Li and Zhou, 2005). To the extent that bureaucrats who control the personnel
system value economic performance, this study proposes the following hypothesis:
H2: The likelihood of political promotion is positively related to firm performance.
Alternatively, to the extent that political promotion is based on non-economic
factors, this thesis expects that the likelihood of political promotion will be either
unrelated or perhaps even negatively related to firm performance.
Finally, this study expects that CEOs in SOEs face both explicit and implicit
incentives, namely compensation based and political promotion based incentives. Based
on literature about career concerns (e.g., Baker et al., 1988), to the extent that both
explicit and implicit incentives are positively related to firm performance this study
proposes the following hypothesis:
H3: Political promotion-based incentives substitute for compensation-based
incentives.
3.4 Sample and methodology
3.4.1 Data
This research is based on all the SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges from 2005 to 2009. Before 2005 most SOEs disclosed the aggregate pay of
the three top executives and only a few listed firms disclosed individual CEO pay in
their annual reports. This study obtained information on specific CEO characteristics
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from the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and data
on firm characteristics from the SinoFin database (both of these databases were used by
previous studies of Chinese listed firms (e.g., Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006a,
2007). As with previous studies, this study deleted ST and *ST 9 firms from the
population. This study also excluded firms in the finance industry because of their
unique accounting standards and also excluded observations with missing information
on the main variables used in my analysis. The final sample consists of 756 listed firms
and 3390 firm-year observations.
3.4.2 Variable definitions
CEO turnover, political connections and political promotions
To identify political promotions this study obtained CEO turnover and departure
information of the listed firms in my sample period from the CSMAR database over the
period 2005 to 2009. This study identified CEO political promotion by manually
collecting information on the destinations of departing CEOs from the listed firm’s
annual reports from 2005 to 2009. This study traced the reasons for CEO turnover and
destinations of departing CEOs to identify those who were promoted to political posts,
including officers of either the central government, local governments, or the military,
or members of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the
standing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC),
or the secretary of the party committee in the SOEs they retired from their CEO position,
9
ST stands for special treatment. The stock exchanges flag a listed firm ST when irregularities appear in its financial
statements. These firms also have negative net profits for two consecutive years. *ST refers to listed firms that have
negative net profits for three consecutive years and have a high probability of being delisted from the stock exchange.
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or the secretary of the Party committee, or a member of the party committee of their
parent companies 10.
Table 3.1 summarizes the turnovers and the destinations of departing CEOs. In this
sample, 1,042 CEOs left office for the following reasons: change of job, retirement,
contract expiration, change of controlling shareholders, resignation, dismissal, health
problem, personal reasons, corporate governance reform, completion of acting duties,
and no reason given. 11 Of the 461 cases in the change of job category from our original
sample, 141 cases fell into the category of being promoted, i.e. the departing CEOs
subsequently took up a more prestigious position, accounting for 30.59% of the total
cases where CEOs changed jobs. This study identified 173 cases where the destination
of the departing CEO was not available. This study assumed that these cases do not
include promotion based on the following: First, the data provided comprehensive
information on business activities and it is unlikely there would be no information if
departing CEOs were promoted to a better position, and second, the information not
available may be a face saving device for demoted CEOs (Firth et al., 2006; Chang and
Wong, 2009).
From the sample of promoted CEOs this study further excluded 37 cases where the
promoted position was not politically related, which left 104 cases of political
promotion. These cases can be divided into the following groups where (1) CEOs took
10

This political promotion definition is consistent with the definition of political connections used in previous studies
of Chinese firms (Li et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2007) in the sense that the political connection in previous literature
refers to whether CEOs currently hold or formerly held the above-mentioned political posts; while the political
promotion here refers to whether CEOs get politically promoted to these political posts after their turnover. After all,
CEOs can get politically promoted either they are formally politically connected or not politically connected.
11
The reasons also include arrested. I exclude this category because in my total sample, I do not have any
observations falling in this category.
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up a position in the government, (2) CEOs were promoted to board chairman or vicechairman as well as secretary or vice secretary of a party committee, and (3) CEOs took
up a new management and political position in the parent company. These
classifications account for 17.3%, 69.3%, and 13.4% of the total political promotion
cases, respectively. For example, a case falling into the first group was Mr. Zhu
Yanfeng, former CEO of Changchun First Auto Works Co., Ltd. who had been in this
position since March 1997, and then took up the position of vice governor of Jilin
province on 11th December 2007. A case falling into the second group was Mr. Yu
Xiangqian, former CEO of TANDE Co., Ltd., who left a managerial position and took
up the position of board chairman as well as secretary of party committee on 4th August
2007. A case falling into the third group was Mr. Wang Weidong, former chairman and
CEO of Tianjin Hi-Tech Development Co., Ltd. was assigned a managerial and political
position of CEO in its parent company on 4th July 2006.
Finally, based on these classifications this study constructed a dummy variable,
Promotion, equal to 1 if the CEO is promoted politically and 0 otherwise.
Managerial compensation
Since 1998, China’s listed firms have disclosed information on managerial
compensation in their annual reports. As mentioned previously, before 2005, firms only
reported the aggregate compensation of the top three executives. This study also
followed Firth et al. (2007) and defined the CEO’s total compensation as the sum of
salary, bonus, and other cash compensation. After 2006, some firms started to use other
forms of incentive compensation such as stock options and restricted stock. These data
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are reported separately from cash compensation, and this study excluded these forms of
compensation in the analysis. Only about 50 firms in the sample were affected by this
exclusion. Moreover, I am also concerned about the time-dependent issue of CEO pay
which may lead to the biased results. To cover this issue, I use the log specification of
CEO pay in the univariate and multivariate analysis.
Firm performance
The primary measures of firm performance were return on assets (ROA) and return
on sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of net income to the book value of total assets, and
the ratio of net income to sales, respectively. Most of the analysis used industry adjusted
measures of ROA and ROS calculated as the difference between the firm specific and
industry median value of the performance measure. This study focused on firm
accounting performance rather than stock return performance because stock prices are
less likely to be good indicators of CEO performance, due to noise trading in China’s
emerging stock market (Chang and Wong, 2009). Furthermore, state owned shares are
non-tradable, which suggests that state shareholders are less likely to discipline CEOs
based on stock prices. 12
Table 3.2 lists the definitions of every variable that used in this analysis, including
the control variables, which were took mainly from Firth et al. (2007).

12

On 29th April 2005, the split share structure reform took place which aims to make these non-tradable shares
tradable. Non-tradable shareholders compensated tradable shareholders by relinquishing part of non-tradable shares.
However, the remaining non-tradable shares still account for the majority of total shares and continue to face a
number of restrictions that preclude active trading on the open market.
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3.4.3 Sample statistics
Table 3.3 lists the summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panels A and
B provide details on CEO compensation and the measures of firm performance,
respectively. Panel C presents summary statistics for measures of CEO, firm
characteristics and corporate governance, and panel D gives detailed information on the
frequency of CEO political promotions in our sample. The statistics in Table 3.3 show
that, among other variables, mean (median) of CEO pay is 728,500 (284,150) RMB,
which correspond to approximately $104,000 ($41,000) USD. By way of comparison,
Firth et al. (2007) report mean (median) compensation of 85,000 (60,000) in the year
2000. Thus, CEO compensation has continued to increase over the period 2001-2009,
the end of the sample period.
Panel B shows that average firm size measured by total assets is 6,770 million
RMB. Return on assets (ROA) is 2.87% on average, and return on sales (ROS) averages
4.62%. Leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by assets, averaged 51.31%.
As shown in Panel C, the average tenure of a CEO was only 3.84 years, indicating
that their rate of turnover is higher in China than the US, where an average CEO serves
approximately 7 years. The table also shows that the average board size in China is 8.5
directors, and they are dominated by inside (executive) directors, with on 3.5% being
outsiders.
Panel D, presents the frequency of political promotions by year. The number of
political promotions ranges from a low of 16 in 2009 to a high of 28 in 2005. The total
number of political promotions was 104.
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3.5 Empirical results
In this section this study examines how political and monetary incentives are used
in Chinese SOEs. This study first examines the determinants of CEO political
promotion and then explore how promotion incentives are related to monetary
incentives.
3.5.1 CEO political promotion and firm performance
To provide some preliminary information explaining how firm performance is
related to political promotion, Table 3.4 presents univariate comparisons of CEO and
firm characteristics for politically promoted CEOs in the year before promotion versus
every other sample year. The mean (median) ROA and ROS of the promotion group are
4.27% (3.12%) and 6.04% (4.23%), both of which are significantly higher than the
performance measures in the non promotion group, 2.84% (2.73%) for ROA and 4.62%
(3.88%) for ROS. The results are consistent with the view that political promotion is at
least partially based on economic performance.
The mean (median) CEO pay is 262,327RMB (213,875RMB) in the promotion
group compared to 741,782RMB (285,320RMB) for firm years in the non promotion
group. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The table also indicates
that CEOs receiving political promotions are of similar age, but have served
approximately 0.7 years longer as CEO, and are slightly less likely to also hold the title
of Chairman of the board at the time of promotion compared to the average CEO in the
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non promotion group. Firm size, leverage, and employment are similar across the two
groups. The fact that firms managed by politically promoted CEOs exhibit stronger
performance but have lower compensation than other firms provides some preliminary
evidence that career concerns associated with political promotion provide implicit
incentives to maximize value that substitute for direct monetary incentives.
3.5.2 Political career concerns and compensation in Chinese SOEs
To test the hypotheses regarding the importance of career concerns in Chinese
SOEs this study is ultimately interested in the determinants of political promotion and
how these politically promotion based incentives interact with direct monetary
incentives. This study proceeded in two steps using an instrumental variables approach
that reflects the endogeneity of the promotion decision. This method is similar to that
used by Faulkender and Petersen (2006) who tested the effects of credit market access
on firm capital structure. This study first estimated a logit model using the Promotion
indicator as the dependent variable. The independent variables include lagged firm
performance measures (ROA and ROS), firm size, CEO age and tenure, board size, and
the fraction of independent directors. To identify the promotion equation this study
included the indicator variable Type, which is equal to one if the central government is
the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm. This study expected the incidence of
political promotion to be higher in firms under the direct control of the central
government. The regression also included industry and year fixed effects. In computing
the measures of lagged firm performance, this study followed Huson et al. (2001) and
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Chang and Wong (2009) by using current year firm performance if promotion occurred
in the second six months of the year, and the past year’s performance if the promotion
occurred in the first six months of the year. To the extent that political promotion is
based on economic performance, this study expected the past performance of the CEO
to be positively related to the likelihood of political promotion.
In the second stage this study estimated the following regression model of CEO pay:


Payit =
α 0 + α1 Perfit −1 + α 2 Perfit − 2 + α 3 Promotion
it + α 4 Promotionit * Perf it −1
+ α 5 Sizeit + α 6 Boardit + α 7 Pondit + α 8 Levit + α 9 Ageit + α10Tenureit

(1)

+ α11 Duality + Industry + Year + ε it
where Pay is the natural log of CEO compensation. Perf is firm performance (ROA or

ROS), and Promotion
is the fitted value of the promotion indicator obtained in the first

stage regression. The regressions also includes firm size and leverage, CEO age and
tenure, a measure of CEO duality coded as one if the CEO is also chairman of the board,
and 0 otherwise, board size, the fraction of independent directors and industry and year
fixed effects.
In addition, to examine the extent to which political incentives substitute for
performance-based pay incentives this study included the interactive term between
promotion and firm performance measures.
Panel A of Table 3.5 reports the results from the first stage logistic regression
where the promotion indicator is the dependent variable. In both models the coefficient
estimates on the lagged firm performance measures were positive and significant at the
5% level. The positive effects of firm performance were consistent with the hypothesis
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that the economic performance of a CEO is an important factor in determining whether
they will be promoted. Moreover, the effects are economically significant. For example,
the coefficient on ROA indicates that 1% increase in ROA is associated with a 4.24%
increase in the likelihood of CEO political promotion. Promotion is also positively
associated with board size and tenure, and is negatively related to age. As expected the
coefficient estimate on the Type variable was positive, indicating that political
promotion is more likely when the ultimate controlling shareholder is the central
government.
Panel B of the table reports the results from the second stage pay regressions. The
first column shows the results when ROA is used to measure performance, and the
second column, those when ROA is replaced with ROS. Consistent with previous
studies (Firth et al., 2007; Mengistae and Xu, 2004), CEO pay is positively related to
both one and two year lagged ROA and ROS. In addition, the estimates on the control
variables were also reasonable and consistent with previous research of Chinese firms.
More importantly for my purposes the results supported the view that political
incentives substitute for direct monetary incentives. In particular, the negative
coefficient estimates on the fitted value of promotion and its interaction with firm
performance indicate that CEOs with a higher likelihood of political promotion received
lower pay and pay that was less sensitive to performance, as would have been predicted
by the career concerns models (e.g., Baker et al., 1988).
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3.6 Additional investigations
In this section this thesis presents a number of additional tests that serve to assess
the robustness of the main results.
3.6.1 OLS results for CEO pay and political promotion
The main results reported in Table 3.5 acknowledge the endogenous nature of the
CEO promotion decision. As a basis for comparison, Table 3.6 reports the results from
an OLS regression of the pay regression in Eq.(1), but this thesis uses the actual
indicator defining political promotion rather than the fitted value from the first-stage
logistic regression in Table 3.5. Specifically, the promotion indicator is equal to one in
the year that a CEO is promoted and zero in all other years. Consistent with the results
in Table 3.5, the coefficients on the lagged performance measures are positive and
statistically significant. The coefficient estimates on the two year lagged are also
positive, but the coefficient estimate on two year lagged ROS is not statistically
significant. Also similar to the results presented in Table 3.5, the estimated coefficient
on the promotion indicator and its interaction with lagged firm performance were both
negative and statistically significant.
In unreported results this thesis repeated the OLS regression described above, but
defined the promotion indicator to equal one in all of the years of the CEO’s tenure
rather than just in the promotion year. The results remain similar to those reported in
Table 3.6.
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3.6.2 Reverse causality
Another concern about the results is the potential for reverse causality. Specifically,
because the government maintains the ultimate authority regarding CEO appointments
it is possible that government officials assign candidates that they would like to promote
politically to firms with good economic performance. To assess this possibility, this
thesis performed two additional tests.
First, Table 3.7 presents the results comparing differences in firm performance and
across firms with CEOs that were ultimately politically promoted, and the remaining
firms with CEO turnover. For the firms in both groups this thesis computed an average
of the performance measures in the year before the year in which the current CEO
obtained their managerial position (t-1), the year a CEO assumed the position (t), and
one year after they assumed the position (t+1). I then computed an average of the
performance measures in the year before a CEOs turnover (T-1), and the year of the
turnover (T) (performance was measured as ROA in Panel A and ROS in Panel B). The
results show that around the time when CEOs were initially assigned to a managerial
position (at t-1, t and to a lesser extent t+1), there were no significant differences in firm
performance between the two groups in either ROA (in Panel A) or ROS (in Panel B),
suggesting that politically promoted CEOs are not systematically assigned to firms with
better performance. In contrast, around the years of CEO turnover, the performance of
firms with politically promoted CEOs was significantly better than the performance of
firms with CEOs departing for other reasons.
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As an additional test of reverse causality, Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the results
from a comparison of firm performance within a group of firms with politically
promoted CEOs. This thesis examined changes in firm performance between the first
year when a CEO was initially assigned the position and the year when they were
promoted. This thesis also compared changes in performance from the year before the
politically promoted CEO assumed the position and the promotion year. In both cases,
the results showed that performance improved significantly between the time a CEO
assumed the position and the promotion year. For example, the mean (median) change
in performance between year t and T was 1.96% (1.82%) for ROA and 2.01% (2.32%)
for ROS. Panel B reports similar tests for departing CEOs in the non-political
promotion group. There was no evidence in this group of performance improvements
over the CEOs’ tenure.
3.6.3 Internal versus external CEOs
As a final check on the results this thesis examined differences in CEO
characteristics between CEOs that were recruited from the internal labour market versus
those that were hired in the external labor market. If one type of CEO was more likely
to be in line for political promotion, then my results could reflect differences in internal
versus external labor markets rather than the effects of politically based incentives. To
address this possibility, Table 3.9 reports the results from logistic models where the
dependent variable is equal to one if a CEO is politically promoted and equal to zero
otherwise. The specifications are similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 3.5, but
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where this thesis also added an indicator, Internal, equal to one if a CEO was hired
internally and an interaction between the internal hire indicator and the firm
performance measures. As seen in the table, neither the coefficient estimate on the
internal indicator, nor the coefficient estimate on the interactive term is statistically
significant. Thus, it does not appear that the results are being driven by differences in
the types of CEOs recruited internally versus those that come from the external labour
market.
3.7 Conclusions
In China, because the government has the right to appoint the CEOs of many listed
SOEs, and these CEOs often have implicit political aspirations as well as an explicit
role as a CEO, the political nature of the latter provides them with an informal incentive
mechanism. To the extent that political promotion is largely based on non-economic
factors, then incentives for promotion may interfere with any incentives to maximize
firm value. Alternatively, to the extent that the central government values strong
economic performance, politically based career concerns may provide managers with
powerful incentives to maximize firm value. This research examines the determinants of
political promotion of CEOs and explores how politically based incentives interact with
direct monetary incentives given to CEOs.
This thesis found that the likelihood that a CEO receives a political promotion
exhibits a strong positive relationship to firm performance, which indicates that political
career concerns are consistent with incentives to maximize value in Chinese SOEs.
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Moreover, as with the models of career concerns, this thesis documents that political
incentives substitute for direct monetary incentives. Overall, the analysis indicates that
both explicit (compensation based) and implicit (political promotion based) incentives
are effective in shaping managerial behavior.
This research is the first to document empirical evidence that CEOs’ political career
concerns provide strong incentives that indirectly align their interests with those of
shareholders. This thesis fills a void in understanding China’s significant growth in state
related sectors despite facing an environment with low monetary incentives and poor
corporate governance. The evidence suggests that state control and political connections
are not necessarily inconsistent with good economic incentives.
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Chapter 4: Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance
relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms

4.1 Introduction
In recent years two strands of research on the effect that ownership structure has on
the pay-performance relationship has begun to emerge. The first focused on the effects
of cash flow rights and excess control rights on CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2009;
Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). With US dual-class firms Masulis et al. (2009) found that
the divergence between insider’s control and cash flow rights had a positive effect on
CEO pay, while from a sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010)
acknowledged there was a negative effect. The second focused on the effects of
different types of ultimate shareholders, particularly between state and non-state owned
firms in a transition economy (Ke et al., 1999; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006).
They all found that the pay-performance relationship was significantly different across
firms with alternative styles of controlling shareholders and proved that it was
determined by them.
Extant research on the effects that separation of ownership and control has on firm
performance and value is well established (Cleassens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins,
2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Masulis et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2010). Indeed it is
common practice to have concentrated ownership and dominant shareholders in modern
publicly traded companies where the largest shareholders exercise control through their
voting rights despite having relatively small amounts of cash flow rights. The
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divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (excess control rights) gives
them the ability and incentive to expropriate the wealth of other investors and pursue
their own interests, which are often diametrically opposed to those of minority investors.
Therefore, while the largest shareholder can mitigate agency conflict between
shareholders and managers, it leaves the conflict between largest shareholders and
minority shareholders as primarily an agency problem. This problem becomes
particularly severe in transition economies where ownership is concentrated and
investors lack legal protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2010).
The separation of control and cash flow rights might affect the pay-performance
relationship. This is important for corporate governance because in an economy with
concentrated ownership, the largest shareholders have strong incentives to directly
monitor managers by relating CEO pay to firm performance (Murphy, 1999).
Nevertheless, the largest shareholders will also maintain their private benefits by having
CEO pay schemes unrelated to the wealth of minority shareholders. This study
examines the effect that ownership structure, specifically the cash flow rights and
control rights of the largest shareholders, has on the pay-performance relationship in
China’s listed firms.
One key feature of these firms is that many of them are state owned enterprises
(SOEs) carved out of former state controlled firms 13 . In the SOEs, controlling
shareholders own substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow rights through a
long principal-agent chain, a significant pyramid structure, and cross shareholdings of
13

Privately controlled listed firms have only existed in China since 2001.
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ownership. Guided by the reform and privatization process, the state relinquished
controls over some SOEs by either selling the shares to the public or allowing takeovers.
Along with the IPOs of privately controlled firms since 2001, publicly trading SOEs
have evolved into an important component of China’s listed firms. Since state
controlled and non-state controlled firms have different operating objectives due to the
nature of their ownership (e.g. they are subject to different regulations), this has had
different results on the pay-performance relationship between them. Therefore, this
Chinese context provides an excellent laboratory for me to examine and explain the
effects that ownership structure, particularly the cash flow rights and divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights, has on the pay-performance relationship.
Within state-controlled firms the controlling shareholders actually belong to
different state owned entities and government agents, which means that each group uses
a performance-based pay scheme that best suits their objectives. It was argued that these
state controlled firms operate with multiple objectives that varied between maximizing
the wealth of shareholders, maintaining urban employment levels, and controlling
sensitive industries (Clarke, 2003). However, his study only covers the early years of
economic reform in China. To gain a clearer understanding of this issue, this thesis
classified state controlled firms into two types of ownership based on ultimate
controlling shareholders, i.e., state assets management bureaus (SAMBs), and state
owned enterprises (SOEs). SAMB is a government agency charged with managing and
controlling state owned assets where CEOs work as representatives of the government,
so their pay scheme may not be based on performance. Public listed SOEs differ from
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the SAMBs. One reason for the existence of publicly listed SOEs is to transform them
into modern market oriented firms to maximize profitability.
In 1985, China introduced market oriented wage reform along with other economic
reforms in state controlled firms where general managers worked as bureaucrats and
were paid according to the civil service pay scale. In 1985, the Ministry of Labor
announced that CEO payment in SOEs should be linked to firm economic performance
(the Ministry of Labor, 2000). However, this scheme did not provide sufficient
incentive because these SOEs were still under the previous system where profits and
wages were redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). With the establishment of two stock
exchanges in the early 1990s and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the SOEs were
restructured and listed on the two stock exchanges. Since 2003, many regulations have
been promulgated by SASAC to evaluate SOEs performance and its alignment with
CEO pay. Specifically, SASAC issued ‘Interim regulations on the evaluation of the top
executive operating performance’ in SOEs affiliated to the central government
(SOECGs) in 2003, which clearly stated that top executive pay should be aligned to
total profits and sales and described how to evaluate executive performance (SASAC,
2003) 14. In 2006 and 2010, SASAC updated this regulation by adding some extra rules
such as the punishment of top executives when they were under performing (SASAC,

14

Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, the SASAC announced two ‘supplementary provisions’ of this regulation which
made further efforts on aligning executive pay to firm performance in SOEs (SASAC, 2007, 2008). Meanwhile, in
2004, 2006 and 2009, the SASAC also promulgated the ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive
pay in SOECGs’, ‘Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOECG performance’ and ‘Interim
regulations on the evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm performance’ (SASAC,
2004, 2006b, 2009).
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2006a, 2010). Obviously, by putting these regulations into practice, SASAC has decreed
that profitability be the primary measure of firm performance, and CEO pay is to be
linked to it (SASAC, 2004, 2006b). Meanwhile, to curtail CEO’s from expropriating
shareholder wealth through excessive perks, SASAC also promulgated ‘Instructions on
regulating top executive ‘on-job’ consumptions in SOECGs’ in 2006 (SASAC, 2006c) 15.
These reforms and regulations of executive compensation in SOEs are largely
aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and management. Extant literature found
a positive pay-performance relationship in both SOE and privately controlled firms but
not in SAMB controlled firms (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007). These
results confirmed that the goals of these reforms in SOEs and CEO compensation have
only been achieved to some extent.
In China’s weak corporate governance environment with its lack of legal protection
for investors, the largest shareholders face strong incentives to monitor managers and
operations if they are to retain their substantial cash flow rights. However, if their
control rights exceed their cash flow rights they are likely to pursue their own interests
and may seek to expropriate other investors by tunnelling, related party sales, and
transferring profits out of the company (Johnson et al., 2000). Therefore, the largest
shareholders’ cash flow rights and excess control rights may have different effects on
the pay-performance relationship. The first hypotheses states that:
•

H1a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on pay-performance

15

At the local levels, the local SASACs located across the country have also issued regulations based on their local
specific characteristics according to the regulations from the central SASAC. For example, Beijing SASAC
promulgated ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs’ in 2004, which has
similar effects of relating CEO pay to firm performance (Beijing SASAC, 2004).
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relationship.
•

H1b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on pay-performance
relationship.

One important characteristic of China’s listed firms is that the majority of
controlling shareholders are state-owned entities or government agents, and the shares
they hold are not tradeable on the stock exchanges. As a result, these shareholders have
an incentive to set CEO pay based on accounting linked performance indicators which
gives them an opportunity to expropriate other investors with more resources, instead of
market based indicators which tend to link CEO pay with maximizing their wealth.
Accordingly, this thesis argues that state shareholders emphasize maximizing profits
rather than stock return. Since shares in privately controlled firms held by the largest
shareholders can be freely traded, this study believes that private investors are equally
likely to focus on market performance as well as cash flows. Therefore, this study
formulates the following hypotheses:
•

H2a: Cash flow rights in state controlled firms have a positive effect on
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while cash
flow rights in non-state controlled firms have a positive effect on market
performance based pay-performance relationship.

•

H2b: Excess control rights in state controlled firms have a negative effect on
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while excess
control rights in non-state controlled firms have a negative effect on market
performance based pay-performance relationship.

Under China’s SASAC, SOEs are directly and ultimately controlled by both central
and/or local governments where it is mandatory that state owners must receive cash
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flows, including profits and dividends, because shares of SOEs are often not tradable
unless under the approval of the CSRC and the selling price is only at book value (Xu,
2003). Since 2003, CEOs of SOEs have been evaluated by a combination of annual
performance such as return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) (SASAC, 2003).
This thesis therefore hypothesizes that:
•

H3a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based payperformance relationship in SOEs.

•

H3b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on accounting based payperformance relationship in SOEs.

SAMBs 16 are the agency holding state shares that are non-tradable on the market,
they do not have cash flow rights from these shares and payouts often have to be
remitted directly to different levels of governments (Firth et al., 2006). The objectives
of SAMB controlled firms are to carry out the instructions of the central or local
governments and to maintain local employment levels rather than maximize the value of
a firm. In most instances CEOs in SAMB controlled firms are officials from the
government with little or no professional background, no rights to select other top
executives, and no responsibility for the economic consequences (Zhang, 1998). This
thesis therefore hypothesizes the following:
•

H4: Cash flow rights and excess control rights have no effect on payperformance relationship in SAMB controlled firms.

16

The term SAMB encompasses state asset management bureaus, state asset operating companies, and
state agencies like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. However, SAMBs, located across
provinces and cities, are merely agents of the central government that manage state-owned assets and
invest them in listed firms.
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The results indicate that SOEs relate CEO pay to firm accounting performance
(return on assets and return on sales), while privately controlled firms relate CEO pay to
market performance (stock return). However, there is no relationship between CEO pay
and firm performance in firms controlled by SAMBs. The regression results show that
the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders enhance the accounting performance
related pay scheme in SOE controlled firms and improve market performance related
pay scheme in privately controlled firms. However, the separation between control
rights and cash flow rights shows a negative entrenchment effect by significantly
reducing the pay-performance relationship in SOE and privately controlled firms. This
thesis also found that cash flow rights in SAMB controlled firms do not appear to affect
the pay-performance relationship, which confirms the consensus that they really do not
have cash flow rights because they must remit earnings back to their superiors (Firth et
al., 2006).
This research makes two major contributions to the literature. First, this research
not only sheds light on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect CEO pay, it
also submits new evidence on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect the
pay-performance relationship. Cash flow rights have a positive incentive effect on the
pay-performance relationship while excess control rights have a negative entrenchment
effect. Second, this research furthers the understanding that different performance based
pay schemes are used between state owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately controlled
firms. Cash flow rights and the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights
influence the pay-performance relationship across firms with different types of ultimate
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ownership. The evidence suggests that CEO pay in firms with the state as the
controlling shareholder is determined by accounting based performance but not
sensitive to market based firm performance. This is consistent with the private benefits
of controlling shareholders because the CEO pay scheme is to maximize accounting
performance in order to extract greater cash flows.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature;
Section 3 outlines the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical results;
and Section 5 presents the conclusions.
4.2 Literature review
All extant studies document that disproportional ownership structure has two
effects on corporate governance; the positive incentive effect of cash flow rights which
enable the largest shareholder to monitor CEOs efficiently, and the negative
entrenchment effect of excess control rights which makes it easier for the largest
shareholder to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders.
The separation of ownership and control by the largest shareholder has been
researched extensively, particularly the cash flow rights and control rights stemming
from a concentration of ownership. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the
ultimate controlling shareholders often use a pyramid structure and cross shareholding
to obtain excessive control rights over their cash flow rights. Cash flow rights are found
to have a positive incentive effect while the divergence between control and cash flow
rights has a negative entrenchment effect on corporate governance (Claessens et al.,
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2002). Similar results were also provided by Lemmon and Lins (2003), Laeven and
Levine (2008) and Gompers et al. (2010). Moreover, Johnson et al. (2000) argue that
managerial expropriation is an important form of tunnelling which lowers shareholder
value. Masulis et al. (2009) agreed and found a positive relationship between controlcash flow rights divergence and CEO pay, while Barontini and Bozzi (2010) found
evidence from a sample of Italian listed firms that CEO pay was positively affected by a
low divergence of control-cash flow rights. Other studies argued that ownership
structure affects the pay-performance relationship. Using a sample of U.S. insurance
companies from 1994 to 1996, Ke et al. (1999) found that managerial compensation and
ROA was closely related in public-held insurers. With a sample of China’s listed firms
between 1998 and 2002, Kato and Long (2005) found that state ownership weakened
the pay-performance relationship. Firth et al. (2006) argued that firms having foreign
investor or SOEs as their largest shareholder tended to relate CEO pay to accounting
performance, whereas firms with a private blockholder as a dominant shareholder
tended to relate CEO pay to the performance of the stock market. However, these
studies only focused on who the controlling shareholder (i.e. owner type) was and their
effect on the pay-performance relationship, they did not explain the channel through
which these effects were exercised.
This chapter fills the gap by using samples of China’s listed firms to examine how
and why the largest shareholder ownership structure affects the pay-performance
relationship.
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4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Sample
This study compiled data from firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007 because information on cash flow
rights and control rights has only been available since 2002. Following previous studies,
this study accounted for the special consideration of regulated industries by eliminating
financial firms. ST and *ST 17 companies were also excluded because they might bias
my results. Finally, this study excluded observations with incomplete information on all
the variables under analysis. The final sample consisted of 1,129 firms and 6,297 firmyear observations. The accounting and financial data were obtained from individual
firm’s annual reports and the CSMAR database, and the information on managerial
compensation, board, and ownership structure from the SinoFin database. CSMAR and
SinoFin databases were used in several previous studies (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et
al., 2006, 2007).
There was ample evidence in the literature that in firms where ownership was highly
concentrated, the largest shareholders were active in corporate governance and had
absolute control over them. Therefore, it was essential to identify the ultimate
controlling shareholder in order to examine the effects of ownership structure. By
tracing through the chain of ownership, this study identified the ultimate controlling

17
ST stands for Special Treatment, refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for three consecutive years
and have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.

72

shareholder of each firm, and classified controlling ownership into three types: SAMBs,
SOEs and private ownership.
4.3.2 Methodology
Within the corporate governance framework, most previous studies set up linear
models to regress managerial compensation against firm performance and corporate
governance variables (Core et al., 1999; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Canarella and Nourayi,
2008; Cornett et al., 2008). Since this research aims to examine the effects of ownership
structure on CEO pay and test the relationship between managerial compensation and
firm performance, this study extended previous research by using the regression
analyses described below.
The first analysis examines the effect that ownership structure has on the payperformance relationship of the whole sample:
Payit =
α 0 + α1Cashit + α 2 Perfit −1 + α 3Cashit * Perfit −1 + α 4 Sizeit
+ α 5 Boardit + α 6 Pondit + α 7 Levit + α 8 Dualityit + α 9Tenureit

(1)

+ α10 Forit + Industry + Year + ε it
where i and t represent the firm and year, and ε is the error terms related to
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. Pay is the
level of managerial compensation measured by the log of the average top three
executive compensation levels. Cash is the cash flow rights of the controlling
shareholders. In the additional tests this study replaces cash flow rights with excess
control rights (Excess), defined as the difference between the control rights and cash
flow rights of the controlling shareholders, to provide some supplementary evidence.
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Perf is firm performance, this study proxy firm performance with four measures,
namely the return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return (RET)
and Tobin’s Q (Q), and then regressed them in separate equations. Size is the log of the
total firm assets, Board is the log of the total number of directors on the board, Pond is
the proportion of independent directors, and Lev is the ratio of total debts to total assets.
Duality is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the board chairman and 0
otherwise, and Tenure is the log of the CEO’s tenure with the firm as CEO. The
regression also includes dummy variables to control for industry and year effects.
This study modified the first equation by dividing the ownership of the largest
shareholder into state ownership and private investors. The second equation is shown as
follows:
Payit =
α 0 + α1 PSTATEit + α 2 Perfit −1 + α 3 PSTATEit * Perf it −1 + α 4 Sizeit
+ α 5 Boardit + α 6 Pondit + α 7 Levit + α 8 Dualityit + α 9Tenureit

(2)

+ α10 Forit + Industry + Year + ε it
where PSTATE is the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables in
the second regression are defined the same as the first regression.
Furthermore, this study extended the second equation by dividing state ownership
into the two types discussed in Section 1: SAMBs and SOEs. The regression is as
follow:
Payit =
α 0 + α1Cashit + α 2 Perfit −1 + α 3 PSAMBit * Perfit −1
+ α 4 PSOEit * Perfit −1 + α 6 PPRI it * Perf it −1 + α 7 Sizeit
+ α 8 Boardit + α 9 Pondit + α10 Levit + α11 Dualityit

(3)

+ α12Tenureit + α13 Forit + Industry + Year + ε it
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where PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) is the cash flow rights of different types of shareholders if
that shareholder is the controlling shareholder. Cash is the sum of PSAMB, PSOE and
PPRI. Definitions for all the variables are shown in Table 4.1.
4.3.3 Measurement of variables
Table 4.1 provides definitions of the variables included in our regression models,
whose selection is explained below.
Managerial compensation
In China, listed firms have had to disclose their levels of managerial compensation in
annual reports since 1998. Because these data are reported as the total of basic salary
and bonus aggregation of the top three executives’ compensation, this study based the
empirical analysis on this information. That is, consistent with other studies on China,
this study proxy for managerial compensation using the log of the average top three
executives’ remuneration (Kato and Long, 2005).
Firm performance
The empirical corporate finance literature measures firm performance using both
accounting based performance and market based performance such as return on assets
(Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Kato and Kubo, 2006 and Cheng, 2008), and stock return
(Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006 and Firth et al., 2007) respectively. In addition, this
study also used return on sales (ROS) to do robustness tests. Therefore, this study used
return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and annual stock return (RET) to proxy
for firm performance in separate regressions, which is consistent with previous studies.
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In addition to these original performance measures, this study adopted industry
adjusted measures of ROA, ROS, and RET by calculating the difference between the
firm’s annual ROA (ROS, RET) and the median ROA (ROS, RET) of firms in the same
industry in the same year. This study reported the empirical results using industry
adjusted measures as the main proxy for performance. This study then repeated the
analysis using Tobin’s Q (Q) as an additional measure of performance, measured as the
ratio of market value to firm replacement value. Following Merhebi et al., (2006) and
Firth et al., (2007), this study used the lagged values of these variables in the
regressions because CEO pay responds to a firm’s previous performance.
Cash flow rights and control rights
To examine the effects of ultimate shareholder ownership, this thesis calculated the
cash flow rights and control rights by investigating the complete chain of corporate
ownership. This thesis defined the control rights as the weakest link in the chain and
cash flow rights as the product of ownership stakes along the chain, which is consistent
with previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). For example,
ultimate controlling shareholder firm A owns 70% shares of listed firm B, which in turn
owns 35% shares of listed firm C. This thesis then constructed that firm A controls 35%
of firm C, the weakest link in the chain, while the cash flow right is 24.5%, the product
of 70% and 35% (70%*35%). Through a pyramid structure, cross shareholding, and
dual class stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were always in excess of the
cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in the additional tests, this thesis
replaced cash flow rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference between
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control rights and cash flow rights, to provide some supportive evidence for the main
hypotheses. To determine effective control at any intermediate as well as ultimate level,
a cutoff level of 10% was used in all empirical analyses, which follows the argument
used by Claessens et al. (2002).
Control variables
Firm size
Previous studies established that CEO pay is its positive and significant relationship
to firm size (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999). Not only are larger firms more likely to
have relatively complicated operating systems and thus be more likely to hire high
quality CEOs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), but, as documented by Chen et al. (2009)
among others, there is a significant and positive relationship between firm size and firm
performance in China’s listed firms. Accordingly, this thesis used the log of total firm
assets, SIZE, to proxy for firm size.
Board size
As an internal control mechanism, a board of directors is assumed to ensure that
CEOs act in the best interests of their shareholders (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998).
Small boards of directors are more effective (Yermack, 1996) than large boards because
a large number has less influence over CEOs and complicates decision making (Jensen,
1993). Hence, this thesis also controlled board size, BOARD, defining it as the log of the
number of directors on a board.
Board composition
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Because independent directors have no conflicting relationship with current
executives they can exercise their monitoring power and make decisions independently
(Cheng, 2008). This thesis accounted for this by defining the variable POND as the ratio
of independent directors to all directors on the boards.
Leverage
Corporate capital structure is an important determinant in shaping the pay for top
executives (Basu et al., 2007; Hernan, 2007) and was also found to be linked to firm
performance (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Chen et al., 2009), this thesis therefore
included the variable LEV, defined as the ratio of book value of total debts to total assets.
CEO-Chairman duality
Modern theory suggests that ownership and control should be separated (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) and that higher agency problems exist when the CEO is also the
chairman of the board (Yermack, 1996). For instance, Core et al. (1999) found that
CEOs received higher pay when they also chaired the board. This thesis therefore
included CEO duality, DUALITY, as an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO was
also chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise.
CEO tenure
Although it is usual to relate CEOs’ pay to their years of experience as CEO in a
firm (Palia, 2001), Murphy (1986) suggested that their ability was not observable at the
time of hiring, so payment increased as they proved themselves over the years. However,
Cornett et al. (2008) argued that top executives with little experience needed more time
to become familiar with their firms and industries but top executives with longer tenure,
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although they have more career concerns, enjoyed better reputations and can therefore
demand higher pay (Brick et al., 2006). Accordingly, this thesis used the log of CEO
tenure, TENURE, as a measure of CEO experience.
Foreign investors
In China, listed firms can also issue H and N shares which can only be purchased by
foreign investors. As outside blockholders these foreign investors can effectively
monitor managers using their professional knowledge. This thesis therefore included the
dummy variable, FOR, coded 1 if a firm has foreign investors and 0 otherwise.
Other control variables
The equations also include two additional dummy variables: Year, a column vector
of a dummy variable to control the economy or market effects over time, and Industry, a
column vector of an SIC-code based dummy variable to control variation across
industries. 18
4.3.4 Sample statistics
The first section of Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics on managerial
compensation, firm performance, and firm and CEO characteristics, averaged across
2002 to 2007 for the entire sample. Panels A, B, and C in this table report detailed
statistics for managerial compensation in these firms based on years, industries, and
dominant shareholders. The means (medians) in Panel A indicate a steady 151.72%
(164.81%) increase in CEO pay across our sample period, ranging from 131,023RMB
18
I follow Firth et al. (2006) and classify firms in our sample into five groups: industrial, commercial, public utility,
property, and conglomerate (all other industries). To avoid the dummy variable trap, I use four dummy variables to
represent these five categories.
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(95,666RMB) in 2002 to 329,811RMB (253,333RMB) in 2007. Nonetheless, these pay
levels were much lower than those reported in research for the U.S., U.K., and some
other countries (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Kato et al.,
2007; Basu et al., 2007), a pay level gap may be attributable to smaller firms, higher
rates of CEO turnover, and/or lack of long term incentives 19 (Firth et al., 2002; Kato and
Long, 2005).
After identifying three types of firms by ownership, i.e. SAMB, SOE or private,
investors as the controlling shareholder, this thesis found that CEO pay varies across
industries and firms according to the different types of dominant shareholder (see Table
4.2). For example, the mean (median) of CEO pay in commercial industry was
236,011RMB (178,683RMB), whereas the mean (median) of CEO pay in property
industry was 339,343RMB (230,000RMB). Likewise, the mean (median) for SAMB
controlled firms was 177,740RMB (129,333RMB), whereas the mean (median) for SOE
controlled firms was 241,229RMB (190,400RMB).
Table 4.3 reports the significance of differences in means and medians of CEO pay
between the groups. For example the t-statistic (z-statistic) of -6.52 (-9.34) in the
comparison of SAMB versus SOE shows that the mean (median) CEO pay was
significantly higher for SOE controlled firms than SAMB controlled firms. These
results can be further summarized as follows: the negative t-statistics in the comparisons
of SAMB versus all the other owner types indicate that CEOs in SAMB controlled
19

Long-term incentive schemes were rare in China’s listed firms accounting for less than 5% of the total listed firms,
and stock options and restricted stocks have only been granted to top executives since the end of 2006. For example,
since the end of 2006, there were 161 listed firms who granted stock options to their executives. Until the end of 2009,
this number decreased to 99 and then only 47 by the end of June 2010. Because of data limitation, I still use cash and
bonus compensation in this study.
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firms received lower payments, while the positive t-statistics in the comparisons of SOE
versus all the other owner types suggest that CEOs in SOE controlled firms received the
highest payment among all types of listed firms.
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Pearson correlations
As Table 4.4 shows, the Pearson correlations between each pair of variables
(contemporaneous value) are lower, which indicates that multi-collinearity does not
exist.
4.4.2 Empirical results
Primarily, this thesis applied the OLS approach to estimate the regression results.
However, because endogeneity was one potential problem for this study that firm
performance can still be seen as an endogenous variable and a function of other firm
specific characteristics, OLS estimation may be biased and inconsistent. Therefore, in
order to control for endogeneity, this study estimated regressions relating to the above
three equations using 2SLS. In the first stage this study used an OLS model to obtain
the fitted values of firm performance by regressing it on a set of lagged control variables
in Equation (1). In the second stage the fitted values were used in place of firm
performance in regressions that are the same as Equations (1) to (3). The 2SLS results
are reported in Table 4.5, Table 4.6 and Table 4.7. Results based on OLS estimation are
generally similar to 2SLS estimations.
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As shown in Table 4.5, which presents the results for Equation (1) broken out by
different firm performance measures, the lagged industry adjusted ROA, ROS, RET and
Tobin’s Q are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. This result suggests
that top executives tended to be paid more in firms that perform well in the market, or
have higher corporate value. For example, the coefficient on industry adjusted ROA
indicates that 1% increase in industry adjusted ROA lead to a 1.37% increase in CEO
pay level (column 1). In addition, this thesis found a positive effect of stock return on
pay. This differs from the earlier findings by Firth et al. (2007) who depended on a
much earlier sample period and found that market performance did not provide an
incentive to CEOs 20. This thesis also found a positive and significant effect for Tobin’s
Q. These new findings of the positive incentive effect of market based performance on
CEO pay are largely due to the fact that Chinese listed firms have become more market
oriented in recent years.
The negative coefficients of CASH (see Table 4.5) provided evidence that CEO pay
is lower in firms where the largest shareholders have higher cash flow rights, and the
coefficients are significant. Moreover, all the interactive terms used to test whether
ownership is associated with performance based pay for CEOs were positive and
significant. This finding supports Hypotheses 1 that cash flow rights have a positive
incentive effect on the pay-performance relationship.
In line with previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Girma et
al., 2007), the results also showed that larger firms paid their managers higher salaries,
20

Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. (2007) find no relationship between CEO pay
and market performance.
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and with Basu et al.’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative effect of firm leverage,
managerial compensation is negatively related to leverage, that is, firms with higher
debt pay their managers less. This latter effect may be attributable to debt being seen as
monitoring by external debt holders (John and John, 1993).
Variables such as the size of a board and number of independent directors have a
positive impact on managerial compensation. This interesting result contrasts directly
with Conyon and Peck (1998) and Firth et al. (2007), who found a negative effect of the
size of a board and an insignificant effect of the proportion of independent directors.
The results, however, are consistent with the evidence that small boards are more
effective (Yermack, 1996) and large boards have a more doubtful influence on CEOs
(Jensen, 1993). It also suggests that the proportion of independent directors is coming
into line with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) mandate that at
least one third of board directors, who set CEO pay, should be independent.
This thesis also found a positive relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is
similar to Core et al.’s (1999) findings that duality in U.S firms lead to higher CEO pay,
but contrary top Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms. This study does note a
positive relationship between CEO tenure and CEO pay, which is not only consistent
with most previous studies (Brick et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008) but echoes the
intuitive assumption of a relationship between CEO pay and years of experience (Palia,
2001). Interestingly, and in line with the conjecture, this thesis also found that CEOs
receive higher payment if a firm has foreign investors.
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Table 4.6 reports the regression results for Equation (2) with a primary focus on the
ownership coefficients and interactive terms. Close examination of the interactive terms
also revealed some interesting outcomes. They were positive when the study used
profitability to measure performance and negative when performance was measured as
stock return and firm value. This result shows that SOEs put great emphasis on
profitability while privately controlled firms care more about market performance. In
fact, during the period of this study, SOEs achieved a higher average growth in
operating sales, which supports Hypotheses 2a. This result differs from Kato and Long
(2005) who found that state ownership weakens the pay-performance relationship.
While they examined the relationship between CEO pay and performance, this thesis
mainly focused on the effect that cash flow rights have on the pay-performance
relationship. This thesis found that for the state controlled firms, cash flow rights have a
positive effect on accounting based pay-performance relationship but had no effect on
market based pay-performance relationship. Therefore, the results suggest that the effect
of cash flow rights on the pay-performance relationship between state controlled firms
and privately controlled firms depends on different performance based pay schemes.
However, the coefficients were only significant for both Cash*ROAt-1 and
Cash*ROSt-1, and insignificant for other terms, so I divided state ownership into two
types of firms where the ultimate controlling shareholder was SAMB and SOE,
respectively, and ran the regression relating to Equation (3).
The estimation results of regression (3) are given in Table 4.7, where this thesis
applied the controlling shareholder cash flow rights to measure the ownership structure.
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Table 4.7 reports generally negative coefficients on cash flow rights regardless of
performance measures, which indicate that cash flow rights will reduce the level of
CEO pay. More importantly, this study focused on the interactive terms. These terms
are positive when firm performance is measured by ROA and ROS and are statistically
significant for SOE controlled firms. The results indicate that CEO pay is related to
profitability and the cash flow rights of SOEs enhance the pay-performance relationship
in SOE controlled firms, which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a. The coefficients
are economically significant. For example, in column 1 of Table 4.7, the coefficient of
PSOE*ROAt-1 indicates that 1%increase in SOE cash flow rights lead to a 0.088%
increase in pay-performance sensitivity. The interactive terms with stock return
measures of performance were positive and only significant when firms have private
investors as the controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with our hypothesis 2a
that a private controller is more likely to relate CEO pay to market performance, and
again this study found evidence that cash flow rights have positive incentive effects on
corporate governance. However, the result of the interactive terms between SAMB and
firm performance were insignificant, which is consistent with the hypotheses 4. When
firms have SAMB as the largest shareholder, they do not appear to adopt performance
based pay schemes. The estimated coefficients on control variables are similar with
those reported in Table 4.5 and 4.6. Overall, the results support the conjecture made by
Firth et al. (2006) who believed that the stronger cash flow rights of SOEs and private
investors (vis-à-vis the SAMB) induce such controlling shareholders to align CEO pay
to performance whereas a controlling SAMB shareholder does not. This thesis provides
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evidence that cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based payperformance relationship when the controlling shareholders are SOEs, due to the fact
that their shares are not tradable. This thesis also found that cash flow rights have a
positive effect on market based pay-performance relationship for firms whose
controlling shareholder is a private investor.
In order to provide some supplementary evidence and disentangle the incentive and
entrenchment effects of the largest shareholder, this thesis repeated analyses of
regression relating the Equations (1) to (3) by replacing cash flow rights (Cash) with
ultimate controlling shareholder excess control rights (Excess). The results are shown in
Table 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. The primary focus was on the interactive terms between
ownership and performance. The general results show negative coefficients for most
interactive terms which support Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, that deviation between
control rights and cash flow rights have negative entrenchment effects on corporate
governance, which is reflected by a weaker pay-performance relationship. This study
obtained opposite results when excess control rights were used instead of cash flow
rights. These results are broadly consistent with previous studies on the separation of
ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1999; Cleassens et al., 2002). Meanwhile, this
thesis found there was a positive relationship between CEO pay and excess control
rights, which is consistent with the argument that it is easier for a CEO to expropriate
wealth where corporate governance is weak, reflected by a higher divergence between
control rights and cash flow rights (Core et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002).
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This study repeated the analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of the CEO
pay variable to exclude any influence from the outliers, and the results are broadly
consistent with those shown in the previous tables. All firm performance coefficients
were positive and significant. More important, the interactive terms between cash flow
rights and firm performance are all positive and PSOE*ROAt-1, PSOE*ROSt-1 and
PPRI*RETt-1 are statistically significant.
4.5 Conclusion
China’s ongoing economic reform and corporate restructuring, which focuses
primarily on improving management, is accelerating the corporatization of traditional
SOEs. CEO and top manager’s incentives, being the central theme in such reforms and
of great concern to the largest shareholders, are poorly understood. This thesis therefore
took advantage of the mandate since 2002 that listed firms in China have to disclose the
cash flow rights and control rights of the largest shareholder in their annual reports to
examine the effects on the relationship between managerial compensation and firm
performance.
The empirical results showed that cash flow rights in the hands of the ultimate
controlling shareholder have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship. In
particular, higher cash flow rights can better align CEO pay with firm profitability in
SOEs, and stock return in privately controlled firms. This thesis also provided similar
evidence to Claessens et al. (2002), that divergence between control rights and cash
flow rights have a negative effect on the pay-performance relationship. These
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observations suggest that the development of a market economy in China has important
implications for CEO pay.
In the Chinese context, this thesis examined the pay-performance relationship in
firms where different types of controlling owners have dissimilar objectives and
motivations. The multivariate analysis results showed that the pay-performance scheme
has been relevant in SOE and privately controlled firms, albeit depending on different
performance measures. In SOEs, CEO pay is linked to firm accounting performance
(ROA and ROS). This is consistent with controlling state owners whose shares are nontradable but who are entitled to cash flows. In privately controlled firms, however, CEO
pay is sensitive to market performance, which is consistent with literature on US firms.
Overall, this study results suggest that ownership structure and types of controlling
shareholders have jointly affected the CEO pay-performance relationship in China.
Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of CEO compensation,
future studies should focus on the unique characteristics of the institutional environment,
such as corporate governance and ownership structure.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to examine political connection, CEO incentives
and the relationship between CEO pay/turnover and performance in China’s listed firms.
One motivation was to determine whether the effective compensation and monitoring of
top executives can be seen as a successful result of economic reform and good corporate
governance, and another was to understand how CEOs are rewarded. To achieve these
goals, this thesis first investigated the association between political connection, CEO
entrenchment, and the relationship between performance and turnover. Secondly, this
thesis examined the incentive of political promotion and its effect on CEO payperformance relationship to better understand the explicit and implicit incentives for
CEOs, and provide some further evidence on how political connections effect the
incentive and monitoring mechanisms. Finally, this thesis examined the ownership
structure and its effect on the CEO pay-performance relationship. The findings from
thesis are as follows:
5.1 Political connection, entrenchment and CEO turnover
In Chapter 2, this thesis examined the entrenchment effect of political connection on
CEO turnover and the CEO turnover-performance relationship. Turnover is regarded as
an alternative mechanism to monitor CEOs and a negative relationship between CEO
turnover and firm performance has been documented by previous studies (Kato and
Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006b; Chang and Wong, 2009). Because political connection
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can enhance firm value, this thesis hypothesized that it may affect CEO turnover and the
relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance. The results show primarily,
that CEO turnover was inversely related to firm performance, measured as return on
assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS).
This thesis was more interested in the effect that political connection had on CEO
turnover and its relationship with firm performance so this thesis provided evidence that
political connection had a negative effect on CEO turnover, and such a connection can
weaken the CEO turnover-performance relationship. These results confirmed the
hypotheses that politically connected CEOs may entrench themselves. Moreover, this
thesis provided supportive evidence for the hypothesis which stated that if replaced
CEOs were politically connected, the increase in firm performance after CEO turnover
was significantly lower.
This thesis found that privately controlled firms were likely to retain politically
connected CEOs because political connection was treated as a source and protection
from the government which was beneficial to the firms, especially in China with its
under developed markets and low enforced regulations.
This thesis also found that managerial ownership had a negative effect on CEO
turnover and that it was marginally significant. Two alternative measures of firm
performance were also applied. One of them was average firm performance over a
CEO’s tenure, while another was a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm performance was
higher than the median level within the same industry. This thesis used these two
measures to estimate the regressions and got similar results.
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Overall, the evidence suggested that, in China where the legal system and markets
were underdeveloped, many companies were likely to build political connections and
sought that protection from the government through the mechanism of having politically
connected CEOs retained even they are underperforming.
5.2 Political promotion incentive
In chapter 3 this thesis identified an alternative managerial incentive, namely CEO
political promotion, and investigated its effect on the CEO pay-performance
relationship. Because many CEOs are politically connected and they were more
concerned about their political careers, the unique characteristic of managerial labour
market was an inclusion of the internal political labour market. Moreover, explicit
incentives such as salary and bonus were quite low, so they cannot provide sufficient
motivation (Firth et al., 2006a). Therefore, this thesis conjectured that the implicit
incentive of CEO political promotion should be a substitute for the explicit incentive of
CEO compensation.
This thesis manually collected data on CEO political promotion, and began searching
it for information on CEO turnover. This thesis then examined the destinations of
departing CEOs to identify CEO political promotion, and defined CEO political
promotion as those departing CEOs attaining more prestigious political positions than
their previous ones. The use of this explicit measurement was different from Gillan et al.
(2009) who were only able to use reputation as a proxy.
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The results of the estimation showed that both CEO pay and political promotion
were positively and significantly related to firm performance. Importantly, the implicit
incentive of political promotion can be exercised as a substitute for the explicit
incentive of compensation. As political promotion can be endogenous and determined
by firm performance, this thesis considered endogeneity by estimating regressions using
the two stage least square (2SLS) method. The general results estimated from using
2SLS were robust enough to correct for endogeneity between political promotion and
firm performance. The results were generally similar to applying another measurement
of political promotion, defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm year
observations of CEOs who eventually got political promotion and 0 otherwise.
In addition, this thesis was concerned about a situation where the government may
intentionally put some CEOs in high performing firms whose promotion had already
been decided. In order to address this issue this thesis conducted a univariate test by
comparing firm performance between a politically promoted group of CEOs and nonpolitically promoted group of CEOs. The general comparative results showed there was
no significant difference in firm performance between these two groups. Moreover, firm
performance had been increasing significantly for the politically promoted group, which
reflected the effort they exerted to improve firm performance.
This thesis suggested that political career concerns can provide strong incentives for
CEOs to work hard and align the interests of management and shareholders. This
additional source of CEO incentives can help to explain the significant economic
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growth in state-owned firms in China, although it was argued that they have weak
corporate governance and inefficient monetary incentives.
5.3 Positive and negative effects of political connection
In Chapter 2, this thesis discussed a negative entrenchment influence of political
connection on monitoring CEOs. In Chapter 3, this thesis provided evidence of a
positive incentive effect of political connection on motivating CEOs. Putting the
evidence together, this thesis argued that political connection can have positive and
negative effects on corporate governance, depending on the perspective, at least in the
context of China.
On one hand China is an emerging market with a lack of investor protection and an
underdeveloped legal system, so political connections can help firms overcome
financial distress and give them access to preferential bank loans and government
support. However, due to these benefits arising from political connection, politically
connected CEOs may entrench themselves and their turnover may also be insensitive to
firm performance. This evidence suggested a negative effect of political connection on
corporate governance by weakening CEO monitoring.
On the other hand, China has a unique personnel system in state controlled firms in
which government has the ultimate authority for selecting and appointing CEOs.
Therefore, CEOs were concerned about their political careers and promotion, and had
the incentive to deliver good firm performance. In this sense, political connection had a

93

positive effect on corporate governance by providing incentives for CEOs and
mitigating agency problems.
5.4 Ownership structure and pay-performance relationship
This thesis also examined the effect of ownership structure on the CEO pay and payperformance relationship in Chapter 4, where ownership structure was measured by
cash flow rights and excess control rights defined as the divergence between control
rights and the cash flow rights of the largest shareholders. The results suggested that
cash flow rights had a positive incentive effect on pay-performance relationship, while
excess control rights had a negative entrenchment effect on the pay-performance
relationship. This thesis also found that cash flow rights reduced CEO pay levels and
excess control rights increased CEO pay level which was consistent with some previous
studies (Claessens et al., 2002).
After dividing firms into three groups based on the type of the largest shareholder,
this thesis found that cash flow rights had a significant impact on accounting
performance (such as return on assets and return on sales) based pay scheme in SOE
controlled firms and market performance (stock return) based pay scheme in privately
controlled firms. This was consistent with the argument that the shares of the largest
shareholders in SOE controlled firms were non-tradable and they emphasized
profitability, while private investors cared more about the price of stocks and wanted to
relate CEO pay to market performance. Moreover, CEO pay had no relationship with
firm performance in SAMB controlled firms because the largest shareholders had no
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cash flow rights. This thesis also found that the divergence between the control rights
and cash flow rights of the largest shareholders can weaken the pay-performance
relationship. Cash flow rights gave the largest shareholders incentives to strengthen the
association between CEO pay and firm performance. However, if the control rights
exceeded cash flow rights, the largest shareholder were likely to obtain their private
benefits by expropriating from minority shareholders and reduced the pay-performance
sensitivity.
Furthermore, some control variables which could explain CEO pay documented their
potential effect on firm performance so this thesis took endogeneity into account and
estimated the regressions applying the two-stage least square (2SLS) method. These
results also indicated a positive and significant relationship between managerial
compensation and firm performance. This supported the argument that managerial
compensation should be a function of firm performance and also indicated that an
efficient pay scheme had been applied to China’s listed firms.
5.5 Summary and conclusions
China’s economic reform has come into effect and traditional SOEs became market
oriented. Since the establishment of stock exchanges in the early 1990s China’s listed
firms have adopted a modern enterprise system. Therefore, the effectiveness of
corporate governance and how CEOs were motivated and monitored needed to be
examined.
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This thesis first examined CEO turnover and the association between political
connection and CEO turnover, and the performance turnover relationship. The result
showed a negative relationship between CEO turnover and firm performance, measured
as ROA and ROS, suggesting it was an effective monitoring mechanism. When this
thesis considered political connection, this thesis found that the probability of CEO
turnover was significantly lower if a CEO was politically connected. Moreover,
politically connected CEOs in privately controlled firms were less likely to be replaced
than their counterparts in SOEs. This result suggested an entrenchment effect from
political connection which was attributed to the benefits arising from them. When this
thesis used alternative measures of firm performance, the general results remained
similar to those using original measures.
This thesis also examined the effect of political promotion on the pay-performance
relationship. This thesis identified an implicit incentive mechanism for CEOs, namely
political promotion generated from their political career concerns. This thesis found that
the incentive of political promotion substituted for CEO compensation because their pay
was comparatively lower, and would not provide sufficient incentive. This thesis also
found that political promotion was positively related to firm performance. When this
thesis took the endogeneity issue into consideration where political promotion is
endogenously determined, the estimated results still held.
Furthermore, this thesis examined the effect of ownership structure on the payperformance relationship. This thesis provided some supportive evidence for the extant
literature. This thesis found that cash flow rights had a positive incentive effect on the
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pay-performance relationship while excess control rights had a negative entrenchment
effect. Furthermore, this thesis also found that cash flow rights had a positive effect on
accounting performance (ROA and ROS) based pay scheme in SOEs, and market
performance (stock return) based pay scheme in privately controlled firms. These results
confirmed that cash flow rights explained different CEO pay schemes across firms with
different types of largest shareholders.
The implication of this thesis is that due to weak investor protection and an
underdeveloped legal system, political connection and ownership structure played
critical roles and showed both positive and negative effects on corporate governance.
Specifically, political connection can entrench CEOs and reduce CEO turnoverperformance sensitivity, while political promotion provided implicit incentives for
CEOs and substituted for compensation incentives. In addition, cash flow rights entitled
the largest shareholders to adopt performance based pay schemes, while excess control
rights weakened the pay-performance relationship by tunnelling.
5.6 Limitations and suggestions for future research
One limitation of this research was the measurement of managerial compensation.
Some of the extant literature defined CEO compensation as the sum of all components
of CEO wealth related to their firms, including the value of stock option grants and
restricted stocks grants. However, stock options and restricted stock were only available
to top executives in some of China’s listed firms after 2006. Because the number of
firms granting stock options and restricted stock were relatively small, this research
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used cash compensation as a proxy for managerial compensation. In future research
examining CEO compensation and pay-performance sensitivity, the focus should be on
including the value of stock options and restricted stocks.
Another limitation of this thesis was the sample selection. This thesis used all of
China’s listed firms but what the situation of corporate governance was in China’s
unlisted firms was unclear because the data was not available. This current research
could be complemented by surveying and collecting information from the unlisted firms.
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Table 2.1 Reasons and frequency of CEO turnover
Turnover reasons

Number of observations

1. Normal turnover

981

68.99%

Retirement

22

1.55%

Contract expiration

298

20.96%

Change in controlling shareholder

12

0.84%

Resignation

300

21.10%

Health

37

2.60%

Personal reason

36

2.53%

Corporate governance reform

25

1.76%

Legal dispute

1

0.07%

Completion of action duties

14

0.98%

Important government position taken up

10

0.70%

Promoted to chairman or vice-chairman

92

6.47%

CEO position taken up at parent company

51

3.59%

Remaining as chairman or vice-chairman

70

4.92%

Going abroad to study

2

0.14%

2. Forced turnover

441

b

31.01%

New position ranked lower than CEO position

94

6.61%

CEO position taken up at an unlisted, smaller firm

22

1.55%

Dismissed

42

2.95%

Information unavailable

294

20.68%

1422

100%

Total number of observations
a

a

Percentage of sample

I deleted 20 cases where the stated reason was retirement but the age of departing CEOs was

less than 60. I also added 31 cases where the tenure of departing CEOs was less than 1 year.
Eventually, I obtained 981 normal turnovers.
b

I added 20 cases where the stated reason was retirement but the age of departing CEOs was

less than 60. I also deleted 31 cases where the tenure of departing CEOs was less than 1 year.
Eventually, I obtained 441 forced turnovers.
This table reports the turnover reasons and frequencies of CEO turnover in China’s listed firms
between 2002 and 2007.
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics
Variables

Mean

Median

Lower quartile

Higher quartile

Panel A: Summary statistics of the full sample
Turnover

0.23

0

0

0

ROA (%)

2.25

2.64

0.84

5.12

ROS (%)

4.05

4.43

1.49

9.80

Firm size (million)

3,940

1,770

1,010

3,390

Lev (%)

49.71

50.25

36.92

62.10

CEO tenure

3.26

3

1.92

4.33

CEO age

46.47

46

41

51

CEO duality

0.12

0

0

0

Board

9.76

9

9

11

Independent directors

3.13

3

3

4

Panel B: Turnover rate across years
Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Total turnovers

269

242

231

255

216

209

Percentage a

27.42%

23.96%

21.08%

22.87%

20.96%

20.63%

Normal turnovers

198

160

155

176

142

152

Percentage b

73.61%

66.12%

67.10%

69.02%

65.74%

72.73%

Forced turnovers

71

82

76

79

74

57

Percentage b

26.39%

33.88%

32.90%

30.98%

34.26%

27.27%

a

Percentage of total turnover is the ratio of number of turnover to the total firm year

observations for a specific year.
b

Percentage of normal and forced turnover is the ratio of normal and forced turnover to the

number of total turnover.
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Table 2.3 Forced turnover rate according to firm performance quartile
Firm performance

Forced Turnovers

Panel A: Summary statistics based on ROA (%)
Bottom quartile

-7.97(-2.56)

0.0939

Second quartile

-0.91(-0.91)

0.0747

Third quartile

1.17(1.15)

0.0658

Top quartile

6.21(4.95)

0.0457

Difference (t-test) a

0.0482***(5.35)

Panel B: Summary statistics based on ROS (%)
Bottom quartile

-35.86(-5.99)

0.0959

Second quartile

-1.49(-1.52)

0.0699

Third quartile

2.09(1.86)

0.0636

Top quartile

20.27(10.79)

0.0507

Difference (t-test) a
a

0.0452***(4.89)

The difference tests displayed in the above table is between the bottom and top quartiles, and t-

value is reported.
The value in the firm performance column is mean (median) within the quartiles.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.4 Univariate test of CEO turnover according to performance and
ownership
Political connection

Non-political connection

t-test

Panel A: Firms sorted by firm performance (ROA)
Upper

4.80

6.32

-1.52*(-1.92)

Lower

7.83

8.97

-1.14(-1.36)

t-test

-3.03***(-3.44)

-2.65***(-2.85)

Panel B: Privately controlled firms sorted by firm performance (ROA)
Upper

0.95

7.52

-6.57***(-5.43)

Lower

7.96

10.12

-2.16**(-2.06)

t-test

-7.01***(-4.31)

-2.60**(-2.45)

Panel C: Firms sorted by CEO’s equity ownership
Upper

2.61

2.79

-0.18**(-2.23)

Lower

7.74

9.69

-1.95**(-2.32)

t-test

-5.13***(-6.47)

-6.90***(-8.46)

Upper and Lower are those firms whose performance is above or below the median value.
Mean value is CEO turnover rate (%) reported in the above table.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5 Comparison of firm and CEO characteristics
Turnover

ROA

ROS

Leverage

Firm size

Board

Pond

CEO
tenure

CEO age

Obs

Panel A: Firms sorted by CEO political connection
Political

6.32(0)

-1.03(-0.16)

-3.91(-0.13)

50.21(50.17)

21.36(21.26)

2.27(2.19)

0.32(0.33)

3.15(2.67)

46.93(47)

3039

Non-political

7.64(0)

0.24(0.13)

-3.59(0.12)

49.24(50.37)

21.41(21.32)

2.24(2.19)

0.33(0.33)

2.90(2.58)

44.45(43)

3258

t-test

-2.06**

-5.84***

-0.12

1.49

-1.90*

4.31***

-4.49***

5.69***

14.95***

(0.91)

(3.69***)

(1.86*)

(0.61)

(1.82*)

(4.05***)

(5.39***)

(3.24***)

(14.62***)

Panel B: Firms sorted by firm types
SOEs

6.95(0)

-0.04(0.04)

-1.21(-0.09)

48.57(49.40)

21.49(21.41)

2.27(2.19)

0.32(0.33)

3.08(2.67)

46.28(46)

4659

Private

7.14(0)

-1.35(-0.10)

-10.98(0.27)

52.95(52.36)

21.07(21.01)

2.19(2.19)

0.34(0.33)

2.87(2.5)

43.86(43)

1638

t-test

-0.26

4.26***

1.67*

-4.25***

17.02***

13.48***

-10.80***

4.27***

12.36***

(0.12)

(2.09**)

(1.02)

(4.93***)

(14.68***)

(12.48***)

(8.08***)

(3.11***)

(12.80***)

Panel C: Firms sorted by turnover types a
Forced

N/A

-2.41(-0.79)

-21.98(-1.05)

53.05(52.11)

21.33(21.25)

2.25(2.19)

0.32(0.33)

3.14(2.2)

43.76(43)

441

Normal

N/A

-2.45(-0.74)

-14.48(-1.01)

51.51(51.55)

21.22(21.16)

2.24(2.19)

0.32(0.33)

2.83(2)

43.67(43)

981

0.07

-0.66

0.60

1.81*

1.19

-0.65

2.94***

0.27

(0.78)

(1.03)

(0.33)

(1.52)

(0.21)

(0.15)

(3.05***)

(0.45)

t-test

a

This comparison sample excludes the firm year observations without CEO turnover.
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Mean (median) values are reported in the table above.
Difference test of mean (median) are reported in the table above. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.6 Pearson correlation matrix: key variables
ROA

ROS

Size

Board

Pond

Lev

Age

Tenure

ROA

1.0000

ROS

0.3005

1.0000

Size

0.2436

0.0842

1.0000

Board

0.0597

0.0296

0.2124

1.0000

Pond

0.0268

0.0077

0.0052

-0.2554

1.0000

Lev

-0.5270

-0.1539

0.0793

-0.0001

0.0537

1.0000

Age

0.0927

0.0408

0.2064

0.0539

0.0070

-0.0586

1.0000

Tenure

0.1084

0.0374

0.1109

0.0267

0.0848

-0.0272

0.1289

1.0000

Duality

-0.0329

0.0066

-0.0356

-0.0778

0.0434

0.0062

0.0821

0.0555

Duality

1.0000

ROA is firm return on assets (net income divided by total assets); ROS is firm return on sales
(net income divided by total sales). Size is log of total firm assets; Lev is the ratio of total debts
to total assets; Board is the log of total number of directors on the boards; Pond is the proportion
of independent directors on the board/ratio of the number of independent directors to total
number of directors. Age is the lof of CEO age; Tenure is the log of years CEO is on the
position; Duality is dummy variable equal 1 if the CEO is also holding the position as a
chairman and 0 otherwise.
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Table 2.7 Logistic regression results of total sample
Dependent variable: CEO forced turnover
Panel A: regression results where firm performance is measured by industry adjusted ROA
Constant

-7.14***(-3.86)

-7.53***(-4.04)

-6.94***(-3.60)

-6.92***(-3.62)

ROAt-1

-1.41**(-2.38)

-5.00***(-4.40)

-4.89***(-4.29)

-4.86***(-4.27)

Political

-0.33***(-2.71)

-0.25**(-2.07)

-0.16(-1.19)

-0.09(-0.69)

4.55***(3.75)

4.29***(3.50)

4.37***(3.55)

-0.12(-1.43)

-0.12(-1.41)

-0.10(-1.39)

ROAt-1*Political
Mown

-0.14(-1.55)

Mown*Political

-5.26*(-1.65)

Private

-0.01(-0.01)

-0.06(-0.04)

Private*Political

-0.57*(-1.73)

-0.58*(-1.74)

Size

0.04(0.58)

0.06(0.90)

0.05(0.70)

0.04(0.61)

Age

0.84**(2.12)

0.82**(2.09)

0.77*(1.93)

0.79**(2.02)

Tenure

-1.43***(-26.62)

-1.42***(-26.70)

-1.43***(-27.09)

-1.42***(-26.71)

Board

0.19(0.69)

0.18(0.63)

0.12(0.45)

0.12(0.42)

Pond

1.04(1.33)

0.95(1.23)

0.98(1.27)

0.99(1.27)

Lev

-0.06(-0.04)

-0.09(-0.39)

-0.06(-0.22)

-0.04(-0.17)

Duality

-0.36*(-1.64)

-0.33(-1.55)

-0.28(-1.36)

-0.27(-1.27)

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Pseudo R2

0.2695

0.2739

0.2759

0.2785

Obs

6297

6297

6297

6297

Panel B: regression results where firm performance is measured by industry adjusted ROS
Constant

-6.69***(-3.62)

-6.67***(-3.60)

-5.97***(-3.13)

-5.99***(-3.16)

ROSt-1

-0.08**(-2.40)

-0.19**(-2.20)

-0.19**(-2.19)

-0.18**(-2.19)

Political

-0.32**(-2.57)

-0.29**(-2.34)

-0.18(-1.42)

-0.12(-0.92)

0.23**(2.49)

0.22**(2.48)

0.22**(2.50)

-0.14(-1.58)

-0.14(-1.55)

-0.12(-1.55)

ROSt-1*Political
Mown
Mown*Political

-0.15(-1.59)

-5.31*(-1.67)

118

Private

-0.03(-0.16)

-0.03(-0.18)

Private*Political

-0.57*(-1.72)

-0.58*(-1.75)

Size

0.02(0.28)

0.02(0.19)

-0.02(-0.04)

-0.02(-0.10)

Age

0.82**(2.06)

0.82**(2.06)

0.75*(1.87)

0.78**(1.96)

Tenure

-1.43***(-26.55)

-1.43***(-26.48)

-1.43***(-26.90)

-1.43***(-26.53)

Board

0.19(0.67)

0.21(0.72)

0.15(0.51)

0.14(0.49)

Pond

0.96(1.22)

0.98(1.25)

1.02(1.29)

1.02(1.31)

Lev

0.16(1.53)

0.24**(2.00)

0.28**(2.13)

0.28**(2.12)

Duality

-0.34(-1.59)

-0.36*(-1.65)

-0.31(-1.43)

-0.29(-1.35)

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Pseudo R2

0.2686

0.2708

0.2729

0.2755

Obs

6297

6297

6297

6297

Dependent variable is a dummy variable equal 1 for CEO forced turnover and 0 otherwise. Firm
performance is measured by both return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), defined as
the ratio of net income before tax to firm total assets and net income before tax to firm total
sales, respectively. We apply the industry adjusted ROA and ROS in the regressions. Political is
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is politically connected and 0 otherwise. Mown is the
control right of the CEO, defined as the proportion of shares held by the CEO. Private is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a private controlling shareholder and 0 otherwise. Size
is the log of firm total assets. Age is the log of CEO age. Tenure is the log of years that CEO has
been on this position. Board is the log of total directors on the boards. Pond is the proportion of
independent directors on the boards. Lev is firm leverage level. Duality is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board and 0 otherwise. Year and Industry
dummy variables are also included to control the year and industry fixed effects.
T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.8 Regression results of using two stage least square
First stage: Dependent variable is CEO political connection
Constant

-7.92***(-5.26)

ROA

-2.19***(-4.82)

ROS

-6.87***(-4.63)

-0.07(-0.29)

Tenure

0.03(0.88)

0.02(0.42)

Age

2.46***(7.57)

2.40***(7.42)

Size

-0.10**(-2.07)

-0.15***(-2.85)

Board

0.49**(2.28)

0.48**(2.23)

Pond

-1.22**(-2.46)

-1.26**(-2.55)

Duality

0.31**(2.08)

0.32**(2.20)

Year

Included

Included

Industry

Included

Included

Pseudo R2

0.0332

0.0284

Obs

6297

6297

Second stage: Dependent variable is CEO turnover
Constant

-12.52(-0.76)

-11.82(-0.51)

ROAt-1

-11.70(-1.43)

-0.15(-1.00)


Political

-4.50(-0.38)

-5.83(-0.29)

Mown

-0.05**(-2.00)

-0.03**(-2.37)


ROAt-1* Political

12.46**(2.46)

0.42*(1.70)

Private

-0.86(-1.46)

-0.68(-1.10)


Private* Political

1.58(1.31)

1.15(0.91)


Mown* Political

-0.17**(-1.98)

-0.08**(-2.42)

Size

-0.07(-0.23)

-0.19(-0.28)

Age

3.23(0.46)

3.84(0.33)

Tenure

-1.38***(-12.81)

-1.41***(-15.58)
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Board

0.62(0.44)

0.75(0.33)

Pond

-0.14(-0.04)

-0.59(-0.10)

Lev

0.13(0.76)

0.21*(1.91)

Duality

-0.05(-0.06)

-0.06(-0.04)

Year

Included

Included

Industry

Included

Included

Pseudo R2

0.2731

0.2688

Obs

6297

6297


is the fitted value of political connection obtained from the first stage. All the
Political
variables are defined the same as previous tables.
T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.9 Firm performance surrounding CEO turnover
Year t-3

Year t-2

Year t-1

Year t

Year t+1

Year t+2

Year t+3

Panel A: Summary statistics of firm performance of politically connected CEO group a
ROA

2.22(2.30)

2.73(2.31)

2.04(1.83)

0.39(1.59)

0.89(1.49)

1.48(1.76)

1.63(2.41)

ROS

4.99(4.17)

6.49(4.28)

1.46(3.07)

-2.35(2.41)

-0.45(2.49)

2.73(3.18)

2.47(3.83)

Observations

85

111

151

192

141

100

83

Panel B: Difference tests of firm performance surrounding politically connected CEO turnover
Different
tests

(t-3 and t)

(average of (t-3, t-1) and
t)

(t and average of (t+1,
t+3))

(t and t+3)

t-tests of
ROA

1.67*(1.77*)

2.86***(2.94***)

-1.95*(-1.15)

-1.08(-1.60)

t-tests of
ROS

1.99**(1.88*)

2.12**(1.89*)

-1.98**(-1.03)

-1.14(-1.65*)

Panel C: Summary statistics of firm performance of non-politically connected CEO group b
ROA

2.66(2.67)

2.43(2.55)

1.30(1.94)

0.10(1.94)

1.96(2.66)

2.68(2.51)

2.35(3.02)

ROS

5.69(5.75)

1.89(4.67)

0.09(3.23)

28.71(3.77)

-4.24(3.90)

2.77(4.47)

3.63(4.55)

Observations

96

134

183

249

196

153
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Panel D: Difference tests of firm performance surrounding non-politically connected CEO turnover
Different
tests

(t-3 and t)

(average of (t-3, t-1) and
t)

(t and average of (t+1,
t+3))

(t and t+3)

t-tests of
ROA

2.38**(1.78*)

2.16**(2.32**)

-1.96**(-1.64*)

-1.96**(-3.09***)

t-tests of
ROS

2.15**(2.79***)

1.71*(1.88*)

-1.81*(-1.70*)

-2.16**(-2.12**)

a

This group refers to the replacement of politically connected CEOs.

b

This group refers to the replacement of non-politically connected CEOs.

Note: the value I used for comparisons are industry adjusted ROA and ROS. Mean (median) values
and difference tests of mean (median) are reported in the table above.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.10 CEO political connection effect on post-turnover performance for firms with
CEO turnover
Dependent variable

∆ROA

∆ROS

Political

-0.02*(-1.76)

-0.02**(-2.57)

Size

0.02**(2.53)

0.04**(2.20)

Board

-0.03(-1.15)

-0.13*(-1.64)

Pond

0.01(0.12)

0.03(0.15)

Lev

-0.08**(-2.31)

-0.36***(-3.59)

Age

0.05(1.16)

0.12(1.09)

Tenure

-0.01(-0.12)

0.01(0.83)

Industry

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Observations

459

459

0.04

0.05

2

Adjusted R

Dependent variable is the difference of firm performance between average of year (t+1, t+3) and t. All
other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. We only report the results of the main
variables here.
T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11 Comparison of firm performance in politically connected firms surrounding CEO turnover
Year t-3

Year t-2

Year t-1

Year t

Year t+1

Year t+2

Year t+3

Panel A: Summary statistics of firm performance of politically connection firms with CEO turnover
ROA

2.22(2.30)

2.73(2.31)

2.04(1.83)

0.39(1.59)

0.89(1.49)

1.48(1.76)

1.63(2.41)

ROS

4.99(4.17)

6.49(4.28)

1.46(3.07)

-2.35(2.41)

-0.45(2.49)

2.73(3.18)

2.47(3.83)

Observations

85

111

151

192

141

100

83

Panel B: Summary statistics of firm performance of politically connection firms without CEO turnover a
ROA

0.33(0.16)

0.61(0.19)

0.53(0.05)

0.10(0.16)

0.53(0.03)

-0.84(1.07)

-1.43(0.55)

ROS

1.25(0.69)

2.45(0.15)

1.62(0.28)

0.13(0.28)

0.75(-0.09)

-0.40(1.28)

-0.55(-0.16)

Observations

180

205

236

306

220

156

57

Panel C: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding politically connected CEO turnover
Different tests

(t-3 and t)

(average of (t-3, t-1) and t)

(t and average of (t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

t-tests of ROA

1.67*(1.77*)

2.86***(2.94***)

-1.95*(-1.15)

-1.08(-1.60)

t-tests of ROS

1.99**(1.88*)

2.12**(1.89*)

-1.98**(-1.03)

-1.14(-1.65*)

Panel D: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE surrounding CEO turnover for without CEO turnover group a
Different tests

(t-3 and t)

(average of (t-3, t-1) and t)

(t and average of (t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

t-tests of ROA

-0.42(-0.28)

-0.85(0.36)

0.81(-0.49)

-1.34(0.05)
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t-tests of ROS

-0.55(-0.98)

-0.76(-0.15)

0.32(-0.86)

-2.27**(-0.73)

Panel E: Difference tests of firm performance CHANGE across above two groups (turnover vs. no turnover)
Different tests

(t-3 and t)

(average of (t-3, t-1) and t)

(t and average of (t+1, t+3))

(t and t+3)

t-tests of ROA

-1.14(-1.12)

-2.64***(-2.43**)

2.07**(1.70*)

1.21(2.19**)

t-tests of ROS

-1.70*(-1.83*)

-1.64*(-1.83*)

1.66*(1.68*)

1.72*(2.97***)

a

The comparison results in Panel C,D and E are based on the assumption that CEO turnover is happened when CEO tenure is four (because CEO tenure
averages 3.26).
Note: the value I used for comparisons are industry adjusted ROA and ROS. Mean (median) values and difference tests of mean (median) are reported
in the table above.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.12 CEO turnover effect on post firm performance for politically connected
firms
Dependent variable

∆ROA

∆ROS

Turnover

0.06**(2.46)

0.02**(2.04)

Size

0.03***(6.25)

0.03(0.29)

Board

-0.02(-0.14)

-0.04(-0.13)

Pond

0.04(0.93)

0.70(0.76)

Lev

-0.15***(-7.00)

-0.63(-1.45)

Age

0.02(0.73)

-0.03(-0.06)

Tenure

0.05(1.28)

-0.02(-0.31)

Year and industry

Included

Included

Observations

1461

1461

Adjusted R2

0.05

0.03

Dependent variable is the difference of firm performance between average of year (t+1, t+3) and
t. All other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables. We only report the results
of the main variables here.
T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.1 Destinations of departing CEOs
Destinations

No. of
observation

Percentage of sample

Important government position

18

1.73%

Promoted to board chairman or vice chairman a

72

6.91%

CEO/vice chairman position in the parent firm b

14

1.34%

Panel A: Promotion

Panel B: Demotion
New position ranked lower than the CEO
position

68

CEO position at a smaller firm

18

1.73%

Information unavailable

192

18.43%

Other promotions c

37

3.55%

Remaining as board chairman or vice chairman

61

5.85%

Other destinations d

562

53.93%

Total

1042

100%

6.53%

Panel C: Others

This table reports the destinations of departing CEOs for my sample from 2005 to 2009.
a

and b These CEOs are also taking up the position of secretary of party committee and vice
secretary of party committee, which are the representatives of government.
c

These promotions refer to the situation when the CEOs take up more desirable positions, but
are not political related.
d

Other destinations is initiated by other turnover reasons, including retirement, contract
expiration, change of controlling shareholder, resignation, dismissal, health problem, personal
reasons, corporate governance reform and completion of acting duties.
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Table 3.2 Variables and definitions
Variable

Definition

Panel A: Managerial compensation
CEO compensation (Pay)

Log of total cash compensation for CEO

Panel B: Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)

Net income/total assets

Return on sales (ROS)

Net income/sales

Panel C: CEO characteristics
Political promotion (Promotion)

Equal to 1 if the political connected CEO is promoted
and 0 otherwise.

CEO age (Age)

Log of the age of the CEO

CEO tenure (Tenure)

Log of the number of years as the firm’s CEO

CEO duality (Duality)

Equals 1 if CEO also chairs the board

Panel D: Firm characteristics and corporate governance
Firm size (Size)

Log of total assets

Board size (Board)

Log of the number of directors on the board

% of independent directors (Pond)

Proportion of independent directors on the board

Leverage (Lev)

Total debts/total assets in book value
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics for all variables
Variable

Mean

Median

Lower quartile

Higher quartile

284,150

152,550

455,290

Panel A: Executive compensation
CEO pay

728,500

Panel B: Firm characteristics
Firm size (RMB millions)

6,770

2,560

1,330

5,270

ROA (%)

2.87

2.73

0.85

5.47

ROS (%)

4.62

3.89

1.28

9.50

Leverage (%)

51.31

52.65

39.11

64.37

Panel C: CEO characteristics and board characteristics
CEO age

47.04

46

43

51

CEO tenure

3.84

3.67

2.16

5

CEO duality

0.05

0

0

1

Firm size (million)

6,770

2,560

1,330

5,270

Board size

8.53

9

6

10

Independent directors

3.46

3

3

4

Panel D: Frequency of political promotion by year
2005

28

2006

18

2007

17

2008

25

2009

16

Note: The statistics represent the averages of the 5 years from 2005 to 2009. All value variables are in
China’s currency, the RMB.
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics by political promotion category
Promotion

No promotion

Difference (T-test)

ROA

4.27(3.12)

2.84(2.73)

2.19**(1.95*)

ROS

6.04(4.23)

4.62(3.88)

2.38**(2.08**)

CEO pay

262,327(213,875)

741,782(285,320)

-2.30**(-2.90***)

CEO age

46.25(46)

47.07(46)

-1.95*(-1.00)

CEO tenure

4.52(4.72)

3.81(3.58)

3.11***(2.27**)

CEO duality

0(0)

0.05(0)

-3.22***(-0.48)

Firm size (million)

7190(3020)

6,760(2,550)

0.35(1.67*)

Leverage

0.50(0.53)

0.51(0.53)

-0.67(-0.20)

Employees

5083.2(2785)

4899.2(2159)

0.42(1.88*)

Observations

104

3286

This table reports mean (median) values for summary statistics. The promotion is set equal to
one if the CEO gets promotion, and zero if the CEO does not get promotion. All the variables
are described previously in Table 1. The t-values of the t-test of equality are reported in
parentheses. The value variables are in terms of Chinese currency, RMB.
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Table 3.5 2SLS estimation of the effects of career concerns on compensation
Panel A: Dependent variable is probability of CEO political promotion
Constant
-1.93(-0.51)
-2.69(-0.71)
ROAt-1
4.24**(2.31)
ROSt-1
0.26**(2.41)
Size
0.09(0.95)
0.12(1.24)
Board
1.15**(2.52)
1.15**(2.50)
Pond
0.77(1.01)
0.70(0.89)
Age
-2.18**(-2.48)
-2.09**(-2.39)
Tenure
1.10***(4.63)
1.11***(4.67)
Type
0.58**(2.49)
0.58**(2.50)
Industry
Included
Included
Year
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.058
0.052
Obs
3016
3010
Panel B: Dependent variable is CEO pay
Constant
4.42***(8.50)
4.31***(8.20)
ROAt-1
2.88***(6.66)
ROAt-2
0.98**(2.62)
ROSt-1
0.53***(5.37)
ROSt-2
0.18(1.48)
-10.52***(-7.53)
-2.02***(-3.22)

Promotion
-29.38**(-2.55)

*ROAt-1
Promotion
-1.84***(-2.91)

*ROSt-1
Promotion
Size
0.22***(13.37)
0.28***(17.96)
Lev
-0.02(-0.25)
-0.25***(-2.88)
Board
-0.39***(-5.92)
-0.20***(-3.30)
Pond
0.17*(1.66)
0.31***(3.07)
Age
1.01***(7.72)
0.61***(5.11)
Tenure
-0.12***(-3.34)
0.07**(2.16)
Duality
0.01(0.12)
-0.01(-0.14)
Industry
Included
Included
Year
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.2246
0.1960
Obs
3016
3010
The results in Panel A are from the first stage of the 2SLS specification for the endogenous
variable, namely CEO political promotion. The results shown in Panel B are from the second
stage of the 2SLS specification. Type is a dummy variable coded 1 if the ultimate controlling
shareholder is the central government and 0 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is local

governments. Promotion
in the second stage is the fitted value obtained from the first stage,
indicating the probability of being promoted. All variables are defined as in Table 1.

T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.6 OLS estimation of the effects of career concerns on compensation
Dependent variable: CEO pay
Constant
ROAt-1
ROAt-2
ROSt-1
ROSt-2
Promotion
Promotion*ROAt-1
Promotion*ROSt-1
Size
Lev
Board
Pond
Age
Tenure
Duality
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

4.95***(6.15)
2.69***(8.03)
1.05**(2.63)

-0.40***(-3.43)
-2.63**(-2.02)
0.26***(10.98)
-0.13(-1.02)
-0.12(-1.40)
0.35***(2.83)
0.46**(2.55)
0.10***(3.06)
-0.02(-0.25)
Included
Included
0.2195
3016

4.48***(5.51)

0.55***(4.97)
0.17(1.39)
-0.40***(-3.58)
-1.37**(-2.40)
0.29***(11.76)
-0.31**(-2.33)
-0.13*(-1.71)
0.35***(2.89)
0.49***(2.62)
0.12***(3.40)
-0.03(-0.27)
Included
Included
0.2023
3010

Dependent variable is CEO pay. Firm performance is measured by either industry adjusted ROA or ROS.
Promotion is a dummy variable, coded 1 if for the year when the politically connected CEO is promoted
and 0 otherwise, Size is the firm size, defined as the log of total firm assets, Lev is the firm leverage level,
defined as the ratio of total debts to total assets, Board is the board size, defined as the log of the total
number of directors on the board, Pond is the percentage of independent directors, Age is the log of CEO
age, and Tenure is the log of years that the CEO has been CEO of the firm.
T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7 Tests of firm performance around CEO assignment and turnovera
Promotion group

Non-promotion group

Difference (t-test)

Panel A: Firm performance is measured by ROA (%)
t-1b

2.03(2.68)

1.65(1.88)

1.09(0.97)

t

2.83(2.95)

2.70(1.50)

0.80(1.34)

t+1

3.01(2.96)

2.61(2.59)

1.91*(1.88*)

T-1

3.88(3.42)

3.07(2.79)

2.67**(2.33**)

T

4.27(3.12)

2.41(2.39)

3.12***(1.95*)

Panel B: Firm performance is measured by ROS (%)
t-1

1.29(1.72)

1.91(3.02)

-0.35(-1.68*)

t

1.89(2.61)

0.67(2.38)

1.25(0.46)

t+1

3.56(2.89)

3.56(3.71)

0.78(-0.92)

T-1

5.89(4.01)

5.05(3.98)

2.17**(1.05)

T

6.04(4.23)

5.13(4.21)

2.03**(1.72*)

Note: Because my sample is from 2005 when the information on CEO single pay is available,
but some of the political promoted CEOs were assigned the CEO positions before 2005. In
order to get the complete observations from the first year of the politically promoted CEOs, the
above test results are based on the sample that is larger than the sample I use in this paper. Mean
(median) values of each variable are reported in the above table.
a

The firm performance I used to do the univariate tests is selected based on the argument by
Huson et al. (2001) and Chang and Wong (2009). If the promotion occurred in the first half year,
I use the last year firm performance, while the promotion occurred in the second half year and I
use the current year firm performance.
b

t indicates the year when CEOs initially got their CEO positions. T indicates the year when
CEOs left from their CEO positions either through the political promotion or other channel.
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Table 3.8 Difference tests of firm performance within both groups
t-1a

t

T

Difference

Difference

Differenceb

T and t-1

T and t

average and t-1

1.96**(1.82*)

1.72*(1.65*)

Panel A: Difference tests within political promotion group
ROA % 2.03(2.68) 2.83(2.95) 4.27(3.12) 2.29**(1.98**)
ROS %

1.29(1.72) 1.89(2.61) 6.04(4.23) 2.26**(3.12***) 2.01**(2.32**) 2.17**(2.05**)

Panel B: Difference tests within non-political promotion group
ROA % 1.65(1.88) 2.70(1.50) 2.41(2.39) 0.48(0.52)

-1.91*(1.81*)

0.46(0.08)

ROS %

1.32(1.25)

0.17(0.92)

1.91(3.02) 0.67(2.38) 5.13(4.21) 0.12(0.08)

a

t indicates the year when CEOs were assigned the managerial position, and T indicates the year
when CEOs get turnover.
b

Average indicates the average firm performance within a CEO tenure.
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Table 3.9 Regression results of internally promoted CEO effect on promotion
Dependent variable: probability of CEO promotion
Constant
1.13(0.32)
0.10(0.30)
ROAt-1
2.46**(2.25)
ROSt-1
0.09**(2.15)
Internal
0.20(0.78)
0.08(0.36)
Internal* ROAt-1
3.36(1.26)
Internal* ROSt-1
0.45(0.48)
Size
0.10(1.13)
0.13(1.49)
Type
0.63***(2.89)
0.64***(2.96)
Age
-2.18**(-2.59)
-2.07**(-2.47)
Tenure
0.91***(4.13)
0.92***(4.18)
Industry
Included
Included
Year
Included
Included
Pseudo R
0.043
0.038
Obs
3370
3364
Dependent variable is the probability of CEO political promotion. Internal is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the CEO is promoted from insiders and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined
the same as those in previous tables.

T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.1 Variable definitions
Variables

Definition

Compensation
Managerial compensation (Pay)

Log of the average top three executives’ compensation

Firm performance
Return on assets (ROA)

Net income / total assets

Return on sales (ROS)

Net income/sales

Stock return (RET)

Annual stock return

Tobin’s Q (Q)

Market value/replacement value a

Ownership structure
Cash flow rights (Cash)

Cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling
shareholder

Excess control rights (Excess)

Difference between the control rights and cash flow rights

PSTATE

Cash flow rights of state controlled firms

PSAMB

Cash flow rights of SAMB controlled firms

PSOE

Cash flow rights of SOE controlled firms

PPRI

Cash flow rights of privately controlled firms

Firm and CEO characteristics
Firm size (Size)

Log of total assets

Board size (Board)

Log of total directors on board

Board composition (Pond)

Independent directors/total directors

Leverage (Lev)

Total debts/total assets in book value

CEO-chair duality (Duality)

Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board

CEO tenure (Tenure)

Log of years the CEO has been this position

Foreign investor (For)

Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors
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Other variables
Industry (Industry) b

Equal to 1 for the specific industry

Year (Year)

Equal to 1 for the specific year

a

Market value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt;
replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets.
b

I create four dummy variables to represent the five groups of listed firms borrowed from Firth
et al. (2006): industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other
industries).
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics
Variables

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Std. Dev.

219,939

160,000

6,666

470,6667

75,649

Return on assets (ROA) %

2.26

2.64

-168.26

46.31

8.49

Return on sales (ROS) %

-0.043

0.039

-83.69

46.63

1.87

Stock return (RET) %

39.69

-3.96

-90.93

1611.78

104.68

Tobin’s Q (Q)

1.16

0.96

0.13

23.44

0.76

Cash flow rights (Cash)

34.41

32.17

0.51

100

18.11

Excess control rights(Excess)a

6.38

0

0

70.56

9.06

Assets (Size) millions

3940

1770

27.3

719000

17600

Board size (Board)

9.76

9

4

23

2.20

Board composition (Pond)

3.13

3

0

10

0.94

Capital structure (Lev) %

49.71

50.25

0.02

1037.51

25.87

CEO duality (Duality)

0.11

0

0

1

0.31

CEO tenure (Tenure)

2.55

2

0.08

12.42

1.85

Compensation
CEO average pay (Pay)
Firm performance

Ownership structure

Firm characteristic

CEO characteristic

Panel A: Compensation based on year
2002

131,023

95,666

6,666

1,575,308 122,442

2003

170,329

126,666

7,666

1,628,234 153,738

2004

212,776

160,379

10,266

3,210,000 213,192

2005

218,176

167,633

8,966

2,726,667 205,604

2006

253,069

196,666

12,000

3,740,000 243,939

2007

329,811

253,333

166,66

470,6667

315,655

Panel B: Compensation based on industry
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Industrial

202,353

140,333

7,200

3,486,567 209,495

Commercial

236,011

178,683

13,666

1,309,300 203,546

Public utility

245,134

202,383

11,424

1,848,030 204,141

Property

339,343

230,000

12,566

4,706,667 485,295

Conglomerate

231,535

185,870

6,666

1,707,057 194,260

Panel C: Compensation based on ownership
SAMB

177,740

129,333

9,246

1,225,333 160,800

SOE

241,229

190,400

7,200

4,706,667 212,011

PRIVATE

211,333

146,966

6,666

1,792,933 210,226

The figures in Panel A are the average of six years from 2002 to 2007.
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB.
a

Excess control is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of
the ultimate controlling shareholder, which is consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). This
information is only available in the listed firms’ annual reports since 2002.
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Table 4.3 Test of differences in means and medians based on ownership
SAMB vs. SOE

SAMB vs. PRIVATE

SOE vs. PRIVATE

-6.52*** a

-3.82*** a

4.86*** a

-9.34*** b

-3.81*** b

-7.17*** b

*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a

t-value from the t-test of differences in means.

b

z-value from the Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians.
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Table 4.4 Pearson correlation matrix: key variables
ROA

ROS

RET

Q

Size

Lev

Board

ROA

1

ROS

0.3005

1

RET

0.1939

0.0401

1

Q

-0.0713

-0.0494

0.5153

1

Size

0.2443

0.0842

0.1836

-0.1651

1

Lev

-0.5270

-0.1539

0.0291

0.3044

0.0790

1

Board

0.0596

0.0296

-0.0298

-0.0768

0.2126

0.0003

1

Pond

0.0272

0.0077

0.1798

0.0894

0.0055

0.0536

-0.2555

Pond

1

ROA is firm return on assets (net income divided by total assets); ROS is firm return on sales
(net income divided by total sales). RET is firm stock return; Q is defined as the ratio of market
value to firm replacement value; Size is log of total firm assets; Lev is the ratio of total debts to
total assets; Board is the log of total number of directors on the boards; Pond is the proportion
of independent directors on the board/ratio of the number of independent directors to total
number of directors.
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Table 4.5 Regression results of cash flow rights effects on CEO pay
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.098***(17.10)

5.450***(16.83) 7.388***(16.94) 5.022***(16.10)

Cash

-0.006**(-2.32)

-0.007***(2.71)

ROAt-1

1.369***(3.79)

ROSt-1

-0.013***(2.74)

0.053**(2.04)

RETt-1

0.175***(6.36)

Qt-1
Cash*ROAt-1

-0.008***(2.05)

0.259**(2.07)
0.169*(1.94)

Cash*ROSt-1

0.052**(2.03)

Cash*RETt-1

0.051***(4.38)

Cash*Qt-1

0.012*(1.69)

Size

0.246***(13.97)

0.274***(18.18) 0.190***(10.41) 0.297***(19.07)

Board

0.198***(3.68)

0.187***(3.50)

0.241***(4.44)

0.185***(3.57)

Pond

0.763***(4.61)

0.760***(4.55)

0.441**(2.43)

0.758***(4.45)

Lev

0.091(1.36)

0.077(1.24)

-0.081*(-1.70)

-0.144***(3.06)

Duality

0.098***(2.81)

0.091**(2.57)

0.089**(2.22)

0.081**(2.44)

Tenure

0.077***(6.25)

0.086***(7.24)

0.068***(4.47)

0.095***(7.40)

For

0.377***(9.66)

0.364***(9.07)

0.428***(9.99)

0.349***(8.72)

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjusted R2

0.2012

0.1829

0.1215

0.1775

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four
variables: ROA, ROS, RET and Q. I apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the
regressions. Cash is the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Size, Board,
Pond, Lev, Tenure, Duality and For are measured as in Table 1.
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The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.6 Regression results of cash flow rights of state and non-state controlled
firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.375***(15.51)

7.292***(11.90)

5.957***(14.89)

5.015***(16.23)

PSTATE

-0.007***(-8.73)

-0.007***(-7.90)

-0.005***(-6.02)

-0.005***(-5.77)

ROAt-1

4.689***(4.25)

ROSt-1

3.049***(4.26)

RETt-1

0.424***(3.32)

Qt-1
PSTATE*ROAt-

0.384**(2.26)
0.073*(1.83)

1

PSTATE*ROSt-1

0.112***(3.82)

PSTATE*RETt-1

-0.004(-1.17)

PSTATE*Qt-1

-0.002(-0.03)

Size

0.236***(11.63)

0.185***(5.82)

0.262***(13.53)

0.315***(21.86)

Board

0.226***(3.75)

0.190***(2.74)

0.233***(3.60)

0.215***(3.55)

Pond

0.582***(2.96)

0.759***(3.27)

0.484**(2.31)

0.419**(2.10)

Lev

0.145*(1.69)

0.577***(3.14)

-0.144***(-2.78)

-0.226***(-4.53)

Duality

0.082**(2.05)

0.089*(1.93)

0.064(1.48)

0.060(1.51)

Tenure

0.061***(4.38)

0.058***(3.64)

0.073***(5.23)

0.075***(5.68)

For

0.385***(8.45)

0.445***(7.86)

0.381***(7.89)

0.345***(7.68)

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjust R2

0.2326

0.2203

0.2165

0.2321

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Cash is the cash flow rights of the ultimate
controlling shareholder. PSTATE represents the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All
other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust
standard error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.7 Regression results of cash flow rights across three types of firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.382***(17.69)

5.678***(16.70)

5.752***(15.85)

5.027***(16.12
)

PSTATE

-0.006***(-7.19)

-0.006***(-8.10)

-0.005***(-4.93)

-0.006**(-2.13)

ROAt-1

8.306***(2.75)

ROSt-1

0.756(1.23)

RETt-1

0.549(1.45)

Qt-1

0.718*(1.76)

PSAMB*ROAt-1

0.130(1.57)

PSOE*ROAt-1

0.088**(2.49)

PPRI*ROAt-1

0.207(1.28)

PSAMB*ROSt-1

0.012(0.56)

PSOE*ROSt-1

0.003**(2.32)

PPRI*ROSt-1

0.019(0.73)

PSAMB*RETt-1

0.006(0.78)

PSOE*RETt-1

0.006(0.78)

PPRI*RETt-1

0.007*(1.76)

PSAMB*Qt-1

0.001(0.04)

PSOE*Qt-1

0.005**(2.25)

PPRI*Qt-1

0.010**(2.33)

Size

0.234***(13.20)

0.274***(16.86)

0.270***(15.35)

0.316***(21.53
)

Board

0.215***(3.49)

0.206***(3.36)

0.228***(3.52)

0.226***(3.61)

Pond

0.589***(2.94)

0.552***(2.79)

0.476**(2.25)

0.362*(1.80)

Lev

0.232**(2.08)

0.023(0.21)

-0.141**(-2.50)

-0.238**(-2.27)

Duality

0.076*(1.89)

0.070*(1.74)

0.053(1.24)

0.061(1.50)

Tenure

0.057***(4.03)

0.075***(5.47)

0.073***(5.09)

0.075***(5.64)

For

0.377***(8.26)

0.365***(8.06)

0.377***(7.78)

0.345***(7.62)
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Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjusted R2

0.2041

0.2173

0.2160

0.2293

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the cash flow rights of each type of controlling shareholder.
All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust
standard error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

146

Table 4.8 Regression results of excess control rights effects on CEO pay
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.222***(15.82)

6.867***(13.16) 6.090***(15.18) 5.203***(17.16)

Excess

0.003**(2.14)

0.004**(2.42)

ROAt-1

3.397***(2.72)

ROSt-1

0.004**(2.44)

2.746***(3.70)

RETt-1

0.480***(2.95)

Qt-1
Excess*ROAt-1

0.002(0.60)

0.462**(2.32)
-0.049(-0.75)

Excess*ROSt-1

-0.135***(3.27)

Excess*RETt-1

-0.016*(-1.82)

Excess*Qt-1

-0.007(-0.78)

Size

0.228***(11.52)

0.186***(6.55)

0.242***(13.03) 0.294***(21.15)

Board

0.263***(4.27)

0.300***(4.32)

0.249***(3.86)

0.242***(4.00)

Pond

0.653***(3.31)

0.680***(3.11)

0.576***(2.74)

0.477**(2.35)

Lev

0.086(1.09)

0.423***(2.70)

-0.124**(-2.44)

-0.202***(4.00)

Duality

0.108***(2.62)

0.135***(2.92)

0.084*(1.95)

0.080**(2.00)

Tenure

0.071***(5.15)

0.701***(4.58)

0.079***(5.68)

0.080***(5.95)

For

0.392***(8.57)

0.415***(8.04)

0.400***(8.21)

0.363***(8.05)

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjusted R2

0.2225

0.2137

0.2081

0.2252

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Firm performance is measured by four
variables: ROA, ROS, RET and Q. I apply the industry-adjusted firm performance in the
regressions. Excess is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. Size,
Board, Pond, Lev, Tenure, Duality and For are measured as in Table 1.
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The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are
given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.9 Regression results of excess control rights of state and non-state
controlled firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.249***(15.59)

6.379***(14.23)

6.097***(15.16)

5.156***(16.83)

Excess

0.003**(2.01)

0.003**(2.21)

0.003**(2.29)

0.003*(1.65)

ROAt-1

3.311***(3.35)

ROSt-1

1.645***(3.39)

RETt-1

0.433***(3.16)

Qt-1
PSTATE*ROAt-

0.459***(2.79)
0.060(1.08)

1

PSTATE*ROSt-1

0.102***(3.10)

PSTATE*RETt-1

0.013*(1.77)

PSTATE*Qt-1

0.005(0.82)

Size

0.228***(11.55)

0.218***(9.47)

0.242***(12.90)

0.295***(20.72)

Board

0.259***(4.26)

0.260***(4.10)

0.252***(3.90)

0.244***(4.03)

Pond

0.659***(3.34)

0.759***(3.61)

0.588***(2.80)

0.474**(2.35)

Lev

0.081(1.06)

0.160(1.50)

-0.126**(-2.51)

-0.206***(-4.04)

Duality

0.106***(2.62)

0.115***(2.70)

0.082*(1.91)

0.078**(1.96)

Tenure

0.071***(5.12)

0.076***(5.37)

0.078***(5.51)

0.079***(5.91)

For

0.395***(8.57)

0.419***(8.36)

0.399***(8.21)

0.363***(8.05)

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjust R2

0.2225

0.1543

0.2095

0.2246

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Excess is the excess control rights of the
ultimate controlling shareholder. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of
each type of controlling shareholder. All other variables are defined the same as those in
previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust
standard error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.10 Regression results of excess control rights across three types of firms
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant

6.216***(15.81)

6.399***(14.15)

6.092***(15.20)

5.245***(17.23)

Excess

0.003**(2.07)

0.003**(2.28)

0.004**(2.45)

0.002**(2.47)

ROAt-1

3.362***(2.69)

ROSt-1

1.949***(3.13)

RETt-1

0.482***(2.95)

Qt-1

0.478**(2.33)

PSAMB*ROAt-1

-0.060(-0.62)

PSOE*ROAt-1

-0.028(-0.40)

PPRI*ROAt-1

-0.064(-0.93)

PSAMB*ROSt-1

-0.076(-1.52)

PSOE*ROSt-1

-0.052(-1.49)

PPRI*ROSt-1

-0.123***(-2.91)

PSAMB*RETt-1

-0.012(-0.65)

PSOE*RETt-1

-0.017(-1.56)

PPRI*RETt-1

-0.016*(-1.80)

PSAMB*Qt-1

-0.043(-1.07)

PSOE*Qt-1

-0.012**(-2.10)

PPRI*Qt-1

-0.007*(-1.79)

Size

0.229***(11.55)

0.215***(8.92)

0.242***(13.03)

0.293***(21.12)

Board

0.262***(4.25)

0.281***(4.29)

0.249***(3.86)

0.243***(4.02)

Pond

0.653***(3.31)

0.705***(3.39)

0.576***(2.74)

0.436**(2.14)

Lev

0.078(0.98)

0.200*(1.66)

-0.123**(-2.42)

-0.198***(-3.96)

Duality

0.107***(2.61)

0.123***(2.84)

0.084*(1.95)

0.085**(2.13)

Tenure

0.071***(5.15)

0.075***(5.24)

0.079***(5.68)

0.080***(5.96)

For

0.392***(8.55)

0.404***(8.26)

0.401***(8.21)

0.367***(8.14)

Industry

Included

Included

Included

Included
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Year

Included

Included

Included

Included

Adjusted R2

0.2227

0.1434

0.2080

0.2277

Obs

3286

3286

3286

3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess
control rights of each type of controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the
same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust
standard error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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